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I. INTRODUCrION
Congress adopted the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA),1 in part, to provide relief to battered immigrant women.
However, there is a substantial and increasing population of women
who are precluded from relief by conflicting provisions within the Act.
The punishment of perpetrators yields unintended consequences that
harm battered immigrant women of color, undermining the effective-
ness of affirmative immigration relief. By neglecting the circumstances
where the woman is accused as the perpetrator, current provisions fail to
address the cycle of violence that may generate false charges against
battered women.
The underlying purpose of criminal and immigration laws against
domestic violence is to protect victims of domestic abuse.2 The VAWA
provides relief to immigrant victims by empowering them to obtain im-
1. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40701-40703, 108 Stat.
1902, 1953 (1994) [hereinafter VAWA]. The VAWA is Title IV of the Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-50002, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-1955 (1994). The pro-
visions of the VAWA providing relief to immigrants cover both genders. See VAWA §§
40701-40703. However, the focus of this article is on the impact that the cycle of domestic
violence poses for immigrant women. Therefore, in this article I will refer to the relief as if all
spouses are women.
2. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 38 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993). The re-
cent trend has been towards increased penalties for domestic abuse. See The Anti-terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 435, 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1274, 1290
(1996) [hereinafter AEDPA]. See also The Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) [hereinafter PRA]; The Illegal Immi-
gration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546
(1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA]; Tien-Li Loke, Note, Trapped in Domestic Violence: The Impact
of United States Immigration Laws on Battered Women, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 589, 589-90
(1997).
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migration status independent of their abusers.3 In order to qualify for
this relief as a VAWA applicant, however, the applicant must meet
statutory requirements that include proof that they have good moral
character,4 a requirement that may not be met if the immigrant women
are prosecuted as perpetrators of domestic violence.5 At the present
time, no mechanism exists in either criminal or immigration law to
evaluate whether a domestic violence conviction should lead to a loss of
VAWA eligibility.
Furthermore, there is no guidance in either body of law to evaluate
the woman's motivation. In addition, a further complication emerges
because under the new immigration law's definition many domestic
violence crimes constitute aggravated felonies.
While some women obtain relief under the current system, many
more find themselves left in the shadows and precluded from relief.7
New methods of treating the issues presented by the victims must
emerge to assist them in moving from the margins into a place where
their interests can be met. This transition can only occur by confronting
the limitations that emerge when their reality is overlooked.
This article focuses on the barriers to relief which emerge from well-
3. See VAWA § 40701.
4. This is an innovation of the VAWA. See VAWA § 40701(a)(1)(C). Other immi-
grants seeking admission to the United States are not required to prove that they have good
moral character. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994) [herein-
after INA] (providing that non-VAWA applicants simply need to demonstrate that they are
not barred from admission under the grounds of inadmissibility).
5. See Melissa Hooper, When Domestic Violence Diversion is No Longer an Option:
What to Do with the Female Offender, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 168, 172-73 (1996) (not-
ing that increased criminal responses lead to an increase in prosecution of women).
6. INA § 101(a)(43)(F) defines "aggravated felony" as "a crime of violence (as defined
in section 16 of title 18, United States Code, but not including a purely political offense) for
which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year." INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) (Supp. III 1997). Title 18 defines a "crime of violence" as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense
that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.
18 U.S.C. §16 (1994).
7. There is a need for the women with power in the domestic violence arena to be aware
of the particular needs of immigrant women. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1265 (1993) (noting that power determines "whether the intersectional differences of
women of color will be incorporated at all into the basic formulation of policy").
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intentioned, anti-domestic violence reforms adopted and implemented
in the immigration and criminal law. Part I outlines the relief promised
in the VAWA and provides a review of the modifications in the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA) as a result of legislation adopted in
1996. Part II sets forth the intensified punitive response to domestic
violence that has emerged in both criminal and immigration law. Part
III examines how the intersection of the immigration provisions and the
criminal justice system create limitations for immigrant victims of do-
mestic violence rather than the intended relief. Part IV concludes by
identifying solutions to be applied in order to better address the realities
of the immigrant women who are survivors of domestic abuse and sug-
gests a hierarchy that should be used by prosecutors and the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) in evaluating claims involving
violence against immigrants.
II. WHAT THE VAWA DOES FOR IMMIGRANTS
The VAWA's adoption set forth two new forms of relief for immi-
grant battered women.9 First, the VAWA allows qualified women and
8. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C.); IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
9. Prior to the VAWA, immigrant battered women depended solely on their abusive
spouses in their application process for legal immigrant status. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at
26 (1993). Only a United States citizen or legal permanent resident spouse could file an im-
migrant petition for the non-citizen. See Lee Teran, Barriers to Protection at Home and
Abroad. Mexican Victims of Domestic Violence and the Violence Against Women Act, B.U.
INT'L LJ. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 17, on file with author).
In addition, these requirements allowed the abuser to refuse to petition for the elimina-
tion of conditional residency and refuse to apply for immigrant status, thus resulting in addi-
tional abuse. See Felicia E. Franco, Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant Women,
11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 99, 117-18 (1996); Lily Dizon, Abused Illegal Immigrant Wives
find New Hope; Law: Husbands Can No Longer Hold Deportation Threat Over Women Now
Entitled to Petition on Own Behalf to be Residents, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 6,1997, at B1 (recounting
story of "Rosa" whose husband used immigration threats as power against her).
The Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90) amended these requirements allowing im-
migrants who were victims of abuse to petition for status without relying on their abusive
spouse. See Loke, supra note 2, at 596-97 (providing a more detailed analysis of the content
of these changes); Franco, supra, at 108-10 (setting forth three significant amendments of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments (IMFA)). While these changes promoted oppor-
tunities for some victims, far too many did not benefit from the change and, thus, remained
subject to the abusive relationships of their legal permanent resident or citizen spouses. See
Michelle J. Anderson, Note, A License to Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on Female
Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J. 1401, 1417 (1993) (noting that the IMMACT 90 changes did not
alleviate the adverse effects placed on immigrant women whose husbands did not petition for
legal status); Franco, supra, at 110 (arguing that the INS regulations undermined the effec-
tiveness of the 1990 changes); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Gender Dimension of U.S. Immigration
[Vol. 83:163
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children to self-petition for permanent resident status.0 Second, the Act
allows women and children to request cancellation of removal based
upon the presence of domestic violence with proof of United States
residency for three years and either a valid marriage to a United States
citizen or lawful permanent resident, or birth of a mutual child with the
abuser." In addition, the VAWA modifies the evidentiary standard for
waivers in petitions to remove the conditional status.
12
A. Self-Petitioning
To curtail the abuser's power, Congress established the right to
"self-petition" for immigrant status. 3 By granting the abused immigrant
independent power to petition, the abuser loses some of the power he
exercised against the victim. Children may file either their own petitions
as victims of abuse, or they may be considered in conjunction with their
abused parent's application. 4 To qualify for relief, a self-petitioning
spouse must demonstrate: 5 (1) a good faith marriage; (2) good moral
Policy, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 23, 32 (1997) (discussing continuing problems under the
IMFA); see also Linda Kelly, Stories From the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants
in the Violence Against Women Ac4 92 NW. U. L. REV. 665, 671 (1998) (noting that interim
regulations were promulgated March 26, 1996, two years after the adoption of the VAWA)
[hereinafter Kelly, Stories from the Front].
10. See VAWA, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40701, 108 Stat. 1902, 1953 (1994) (creating INA
§§ 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) & (iv), 204(a)(1)(B)(ii) & (iii)). To qualify, the woman must be married
to a legal permanent resident or United States citizen. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(iii) (1999);
61 Fed. Reg. 13061, 13062 (1996). The Act does not provide relief for women who are mar-
ried to non-legal permanent residents or non-United States citizens. See 8 C.F.R. §
204.2(c)(1)(iii).
11. See INA §240A(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (Supp. I1 1997) (codifying cancella-
tion of removal for spousal abuse victims).
12. See INA §216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (1994) (allowing women to waive the re-
quirements for filing a joint petition and terminate the conditional residency if they demon-
strate either, (1) extreme hardship, or (2) a good faith marriage and divorce, or (3) abuse or
extreme cruelty directed toward either the alien spouse or child).
13. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c) (1999).
14. See 8 C.F.R. § 204(c)(4) (1999).
15. The applicant files a form 1-360 at the Vermont Service Center with the necessary
supporting information. See 62 Fed. Reg. 16607, 16607-08 (1997). The Vermont Service Cen-
ter is the direct mailing location for all battered spouse and children's self-petitions. See id.
16. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) (1994). Preliminary
eligibility limits relief to a person who is married to a United States citizen or a lawful perma-
nent resident at the time that the application is made, and the marriage must have been en-
tered into in good faith. See Matter of Laureano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2-3 (B.I.A. 1983) (noting
that evidence demonstrating a good faith marriage includes, but is not limited to, proof that
one's spouse has "been listed on insurance policies, property leases, income tax forms or bank
accounts, and testimony or other evidence regarding courtship, wedding ceremony, shared
residence and experiences").
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character;17 (3) extreme hardship to herself or certain family members; 18
The regulations and the VAWA's language require the petitioner to be married to the
abuser when the petition is filed. See VAWA § 40701(a)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(ii)
(1999); 61 Fed. Reg. 13061, 13062 (1996); see also Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors:
Surviving the Beatings of 1996, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 303, 321 (1997) (discussing the tension
between combating fraud and ending domestic violence) [hereinafter Kelly, Doemstic Vio-
lence Survivors]. Common law marriages may also be grounds for relief as long as there is
evidence demonstrating a common law marriage. See Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1414-15 (9"
Cir. 1994) (holding that common law marriages recognized by the state are relevant to relief
and therefore, it would be inappropriate to allow the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to
apply divergent state law in the absence of an express or implied Congressional intention to
the contrary). The victim, however, is not required to stay married to the abuser. Once the
application is filed, a divorce from the abuser will not affect the application. See 8 C.F.R. §
204.2(c)(1)(ii); 61 Fed. Reg. 13062-63. If the petition is not filed before the divorce or death
of the abuser, no relief will be granted through the VAWA. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(ii); 61
Fed. Reg. 13062. Filing is not considered complete until all required fees have been paid or
waived. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(c) (1999); 61 Fed. Reg. 13069. As a general rule, in immigration
cases, fee waivers on affirmative visa petitions are not allowed. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(c); 61
Fed. Reg. 13069. However, recognizing that many victims will have left their abusive envi-
ronments with little or no resources the INS will allow a petition with a fee waiver but the pe-
tition will not be considered filed until the fee waiver request is granted. See 61 Fed. Reg.
13069.
17. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii). Essentially, good moral character is relevant in deter-
mining eligibility for a visa under VAWA. See infra notes 30-31 (discussing the absence of
this requirement for other visa holders). While Congress provided little guidance about this
requirement, the INS established a three-year good moral character test for VAWA appli-
cants. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(v) & (e)(2)(v). The INS requires petitioners to submit
three years of police records with the application. The regulations also incorporate the stan-
dards from INA §101(f), and some provisions in the naturalization requirements that must be
established as proof of good moral character. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vii); INA § 101(f), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Behavior during that period that will disqualify a
petitioner includes: habitual drunkenness, see INA § 101(f)(1); conviction or admission to
commission of a drug offense, see INA § 101(f)(3); but see Matter of Grullon, 20 I. & N. Dec.
12, 15 (B.I.A. 1989) (holding that a drug possession charge dismissed under Florida's pretrial
intervention program is not a conviction); conviction or admission to commission of a crime
of moral turpitude, see INA § 101(f)(3); Miller v. INS, 762 F.2d 21, 23-24 (3d Cir. 1989)
(finding welfare fraud to constitute crime of moral turpitude); engaging in polygamy, see INA
§ 101(f)(3); deriving income principally from gambling or being convicted of two or more
gambling offenses, see INA §§ 101(f)(4) & (5); conviction for an offense for which the peti-
tioner has spent more than 180 days in jail, see INA § 101(f)(7); see also Rivera-Zurita v. INS,
946 F.2d 118, 121 (10"' Cir. 1991) (holding that the burden rests with petitioner to prove he
was not incarcerated for more than 180 days); conviction for two or more crimes for which the
petitioner has been convicted to five years or more, see INA § 101(f)(3); engaging in prostitu-
tion, see id.; engaging in alien smuggling, see id.; and giving false testimony for an immigration
benefit, see INA § 101(f)(6); see. also United States v. Kungus, 485 U.S. 759, 782 (1988)
(holding that testimony need not be material); Torres-Guzman v. INS, 804 F.2d 531, 533 n.2
(9t' Cir. 1986) (noting that the statement must have been made under oath in a court or tribu-
nal) (citing Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1018-19 (9" Cir. 1981), revd on other grounds,
464 U.S. 183 (1984)). In addition, if a petitioner at any time has been convicted of an aggra-
vated felony as defined by INA § 101(a)(43), which includes some state misdemeanors, the
defendant will be disqualified. See INA § 101(f)(8); see also INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. §
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(4) marriage to a United States citizen or legal permanent resident;9 and
(5) residence in the United States with the abusing spouse."
1101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
The INS applies these requirements in light of "the average citizen in the community." 8
C.F.R. §§204.2(c)(1)(vii) & (e)(1)(vii). This standard may unfairly compare a battered
woman to a non-battered person who is in the community. The INA states that convictions
for crimes defined as aggravated felonies are non-waivable bars to a finding of good moral
character. See INA § 101(f)(8).
For the purposes of this Act - No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a per-
son of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character
is required to be established, is or was... (8) one who at any time has been con-
victed of an aggravated felony (as defined in subsection [101](a)(43)).
Id. Thus, a conviction as an aggravated felon precludes a finding of good moral character.
18. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II). The phrase "extreme hardship" is not defined in the
Act, and "[s]eif petitioners are encouraged to cite and document all applicable [extreme hard-
ship] factors, since there is no guarantee that a particular reason or reasons will result in a
finding that deportation would cause extreme hardship." 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.2(c)(1)(viii) &
(e)(1)(viii). In a memorandum dated October 16, 1998, the INS clarifies that the extreme
hardship requirements must be made on a case by case basis. Furthermore, the finding of
abuse does not require the finding of extreme hardship. See Paul W. Virtue, General Coun-
sel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Extreme Hardship" and Documentary Re-
quirements Involving Battered Spouses and Children, 2, 6, (INS Mem. HQ 90/15-P, HQ 70/8-
P) (Oct. 16, 1998), reprinted in 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 162-69 (Jan. 25, 1999) [hereinaf-
ter, Virtue, Extreme Hardship].
19. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) & (B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.2(c)(1)(iii) & (e)(1)(iii). The
primary evidence of this status is a U.S. birth certificate, naturalization certificate or number,
or a copy of the "green card." See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(g) (1999); 61 Fed Reg. 13063. If the pri-
mary evidence is not available or attainable by the self-petitioner, she may request assistance
from the INS in ascertaining the abuser's status. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(g); 61 Fed Reg. 13063.
Once the application is filed, the INS must check computer and paper records in an attempt
to determine the abuser's status. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(17) & 204.1(g)(3) (1999); 61 Fed.
Reg. 13063-64. Where the record search is negative or inconclusive, "the self-petition will be
adjudicated based on the information submitted by the self-petitioner." 8 C.F.R. §§
103.2(b)(17) & 204.1(g)(3); 61 Fed. Reg. 13063.
The Act does not provide relief for women who are married to a non-legal permanent
resident or a non-U.S. citizen. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(ii). The purpose of the Act was to
minimize oppression by legal permanent residents and United States citizens against immi-
grant women. Thus, an essential aspect of the law's requirements is the ability of the abuser
to transmit immigrant status through INA §201(b)(2)(A)(i) or §203(a)(2)(A). See INA §
201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994); INA § 203(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1153(a)(2)(A) (1994).
20. See INA § 204 (a)(1)(A)(iii). This requirement may be difficult to establish when
the woman has been kept in isolation by the abuser as part of the abuse. It is common for
victims of abuse to be isolated. See Jennifer Nislow, The New Yorkers: Battered Women in a
Strange Land - An Advocacy Group Helps South Asian Immigrants, NEWSDAY, May 22,1996,
at A29 (reporting that the experience of a Bangladeshi woman, Syeda Suflan, who was
"beaten and physically tortured for years" and did not go to the police because her abuse
convinced her she would be deported if she went to the police). "Brought by their husbands
1999]
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A woman who obtains the status of lawful permanent residence
through the self-petitioning process is not subject to the conditional
residence requirement.2' This is sensible given that the basis upon which
women are seeking relief indicates that the abusive spouse will not be
available to jointly petition for the removal of the condition.' Thus, a
woman with a current visa can use it as the basis of her self-petition and
will be granted status as a lawful permanent resident regardless of the
length of the marriage.2' Where a visa is not currently available, the ap-
plicant is placed in deferred action status. '
A VAWA-qualified woman must not only demonstrate good moral
character to qualify for VAWA relief, but she must also maintain good
moral character.' A non-VAWA visa applicant, on the other hand, is
to a country where they do not speak the language, have no knowledge of the laws or cus-
toms, and are dependent on spouses, these women become completely isolated...." ld.
The abusers may preclude victims from contacting family and may threaten them if they
attempt any outside contact. See Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Di-
vorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 333-36 (1997) (describing
methods of control used by abusers). Undocumented immigrants are isolated further due to
lack of work authorization and economic dependency on their abusers. See Ryan Lilienthal,
Note, Old Hurdles Hamper New Options for Battered Immigrant Women, 62 BROOK L. REV.
1595, 1626-1627 (1996). If she is undocumented, she also has a fear of detection that works
against her ability to satisfy this requirement and feeds into the power that the abuser has
over the woman. See Nancy San Martin, Residency Door Opens for Women Abused by
Spouses, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.) Sept. 10, 1995, at B1 (reporting the experience
of Kathleen, an illegal alien, who stayed with her husband because "she is alone in a country
where she lives illegally ").
21. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.1 (1999). "The Service has determined that no useful purpose
would be served by imposing the conditional residency requirements of section 216 of the Act
on any self-petitioner; all self-petitioners would necessarily be eligible for waivers of the joint
petitioning requirement." 61 Fed. Reg. 13061, 13070 (1996).
22. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(a)(1) (discussing waiver of joint petition in cases of spousal
abuse); 61 Fed. Reg. 13061, 13070 (1996).
23. In non-VAWA cases, the conditional residency applies unless the parties are mar-
ried for more than two years prior to filing for immigration status. See INA § 216(g)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1186a(g)(1) (1994).
24. "Deferred action" is an administrative method of halting deportation. See 8 C.F.R. §
274a.12(c)(14) (1999). On deferred action, an applicant is eligible to remain in the United
States and to obtain work authorization. This status was administratively authorized for
VAWA applicants. See Memorandum from T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Executive Associate
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Implementation of Crime Bill Self-
Petitioning for Abused or Battered Spouses or Children of U.S. Citizens or Lawful Permanent
Residents 5, (INS Mem. HQ 204-P) (Apr. 16, 1996), reprinted in 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES
737-43 (May 24, 1996); Memorandum from Paul W. Virtue, Acting Executive Comm'r, Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, Supplemental Guidance on Battered Alien Self-Petitioning
Process and Related Issues 3, (May 6, 1997), reprinted in 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 971-77
(June 16, 1997) [hereinafter Virtue, Supplemental Guidance].
25. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vii) (1999).
[Vol. 83:163
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not required to demonstrate good moral character at the time of ad-
justing this status to legal permanent residency.' A criminal conviction
for an aggravated felony or for a crime of moral turpitude will preclude
such a finding.'
In the event that the abuser makes a criminal complaint in retalia-
tion, such as one made by the abuser to leverage power, adverse and un-
foreseen consequences emerge for the immigrant woman.2 If an abused
woman is charged with domestic violence, a conviction may have ex-
tended adverse consequences. Although the VAWA applicant may ob-
tain a waiver of the provision that renders an applicant inadmissible be-
cause of a crime of moral turpitude conviction under INA section
212(h)1' it is unclear whether such a waiver eliminates the conviction for
purposes of qualifying as a person of good moral character under the
VAWA requirements. In other words, the waiver of the crime for ad-
missibility purposes does not guarantee that the crime cannot be used to
bar a finding of good moral character. This poses unique problems for
VAWA applicants because the lack of good moral character is not a
specific bar to admission for non-VAWA adjustment applicants, but
lack of good moral character precludes VAWA relief? Additionally, if
the conviction is for an offense that is not only a crime of moral turpi-
tude but also within the definition of aggravated felony, there are no
waivers, and although standing alone, this would not preclude adjust-
ment for other visa holders,31 it mandates an adverse result for VAWA
applicants who cannot meet the eligibility requirements of the VAWA.
26. See INA § 212 (noting the list of grounds of inadmissibility and that lack of good
moral character is not within the section).
27. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. III 1997). See also
infra note 75 (discussing domestic violence crimes as crimes of moral turpitude). The convic-
tion of a crime of moral turpitude is not a conclusive bar to admissibility, but it is wise to ob-
tain a waiver.
28. See INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994) (allowing adjustment of the "status of a non-
immigrant to that of [a] person admitted for permanent residence").
29. See INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994) (providing a discretionary waiver for a
crime of moral turpitude).
30. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1994).
31. See In re Michel, BIA Pub. 3335, Inv. No. A74-342-000, at 3 (Jan. 30, 1998) (holding
that an aggravated felon visa holder may adjust his status in the United States even though he
would be barred from entry if he left the United States); Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a
Blindfold. Criminal Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REv. 269, 297, 329
(1997) ("The aggravated felon whose offense was neither a crime of moral turpitude nor a
crime relating to controlled substances, for example, is facially eligible for adjustment stan-
dards.").
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B. Cancellation of Removal under Section 240A
There are no regulations that define the criteria for cancellation of
removal for a VAWA applicant.32 Under the INA, an individual in re-
moval proceedings may apply for relief from removal if they qualify as a
victim of domestic abuse, as defined in the VAWA.3 A positive deter-
mination of eligibility may waive removal and grant the battered woman
lawful permanent residency.' To qualify for cancellation of removal,
the immigrant battered woman must meet the following requirements:
(1) she was battered or subject to extreme cruelty by a U.S. citizen or le-
gal permanent resident spouse during marriage while she was in the
United States, or she is the parent of a child of a U.S. citizen or legal
permanent resident and the child has been subjected to physical abuse
or extreme cruelty;35 (2) she has been continuously physically present in
the United States for three years immediately preceding her filing the
application; 6 (3) she is a person of good moral character;' and (4) leav-
32. The relief resurrected in IIRIRA to replace suspension of deportation was elimi-
nated for all practical purposes in AEDPA. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 435, 440,
110 Stat. 1214, 1259 (1996); INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. 1229b (Supp. III 1997). The AEDPA un-
dermined the availability of this relief for many women by statutorily defining those who en-
ter without inspection as being outside the U.S. and therefore ineligible for deportation pro-
ceedings. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 435, 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1259 (1996); INA §
240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (Supp. III 1997).
33. See INA § 240A(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (Supp. III 1997). Suspension of de-
portation has been eliminated as a possibility for VAWA qualifying women. See Loke, supra
note 2, at 612.
34. See INA § 240A(b)(2).
35. See INA § 240A(b)(2)(A). Unlike the self-petitioning rules, the cancellation provi-
sions do not require the woman to be the spouse of an abuser at the time of the application.
See id. If she is applying due to violence to herself, she simply needs to demonstrate that
there was abuse during the marriage to the U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident. See id.
(precluding relief for violence committed by a non-citizen or non-legal permanent resident).
The statute requires the abuse be "by a spouse or parent who is a United States citizen or
lawful permanent resident." Id. If no marriage to the abuser existed, but the battered woman
and abuser share a child in common who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty,
the cancellation provisions allow both her and the child to obtain cancellation of removal.
See id.
36. See INA § 240A(b)(2)(B). Current law sets forth a statutory definition of what will
eliminate continuous physical presence. See INA § 240A(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d) (Supp. III
1997). It is broader than the old suspension provision which made any absence a basis of in-
eligibility. See INA § 244(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3) (1994), repealed by IIRIRA §
308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-615 (1996). Notwithstanding the new relaxed standard,
the three-year continuous physical presence requirement poses two hurdles for the applicant.
See INA § 240A(b)(2)(B). First, she cannot have left the United States for an aggregate of
180 days, and she cannot have any single absence longer than 90 days. See INA § 240A(d)(2).
Second, the time period for establishing physical presence tolls once a notice to appear is is-
sued. "[A]ny period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United
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ing the United States would cause extreme hardship to herself or her
children.'
If a VAWA applicant is divorced and reports to or is found by the
INS before she has been present in the United States for three years, she
will not qualify for a cancellation of removal. 9 This provision heightens
the possibility of retaliation by the abuser and increases the chance that
the woman will remain hidden from assistance likely to subject her to
INS detection.
C. Removal of Conditional Residency
Women who enter the United States through a petition filed by a
United States citizen spouse or a legal permanent resident, who have
been married for less than two years, are not granted full immigration
status as a legal permanent resident.40 They are subject to a conditional
residency requirement which is removed by a joint petition of the
spouses made within ninety days of the end of the two-year period.4'
States shall be deemed to end when the alien is served a notice to appear...." INA §
240A(d)(1).
37. See INA § 240A(b)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(2)(D) (Supp. I1 1997). Once an ap-
plicant demonstrates eligibility for cancellation of removal, the Attorney General may "adjust
her status." INA §240A(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). Although the term "adjustment of
status" is used in this section, it does not refer to traditional adjustment of status as defined in
INA § 245. See generally INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994). Here the applicant's status is
changed to legal permanent resident if she meets the VAWA requirements. See INA §
240A(b)(2). She must also fall within the annual limit of 4,000 applicants per year. See INA §
240A(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1) (Supp. I1 1997). If no visas are available, the immigration
judges issue conditional relief. The conditional relief was authorized by an interim rule pub-
lished to handle cases decided before the issuance of interim regulations needed to address
sections 304(a)(3) and 309(c)(7) of HRIRA. See 62 Fed. Reg. 51760,51761 (1997). However,
now no such conditional relief may be granted. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.21(a) (1999), 63 Fed. Reg.
52134, 52135 (1998) (discussing the regulations issued jointly by the INS and the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) which set forth the criteria for conversion of condi-
tional relief under an affirmative grant). Under the rules concerning those individuals given
conditional relief, the INS is given 90 days to file motions to reopen before the grant of legal
permanent residency attaches if there is reason to believe that an individual is no longer eligi-
ble for suspension or cancellation. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.21(b)(4) (1999). Since the "good moral
character" requirement is required at the time of the change, it is possible that actions that
occurred post hearing and pre "adjustment" may create a basis to revoke the original grant of
cancellation. It is unclear what procedure will be followed to see that she has maintained
good moral character when a visa is available.
38. See INA § 240A(b)(2)(E).
39. See INA § 240(b)(2)(B).
40. See INA § 216(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186(a)(1) (1994). Legal permanent residents pos-
sess what is commonly called a "green card" and are accorded the privilege of residing in the
United States as an immigrant. See INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1994).
41. See INA § 216(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1)(A) (1994). The IMFA, adopted in
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Pursuant to amendments passed in the Immigration Act of 1990
(IMMACT 90), a battered immigrant woman may terminate her condi-
tional resident status without the aid of her abusive spouse by obtaining
a waiver. ' To obtain the waiver, she must show that she was abused or
subjected to extreme cruelty committed by a citizen or lawful permanent
resident spouse, or her children were battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty by a citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse. 3 In the
VAWA, Congress eased the evidentiary burden regarding proof of ex-
treme cruelty and directed the INS to accept "any credible evidence" for
this waiver."
This change, however, is not codified in the regulations, and the INS
regulations still limit the type of evidence allowed to prove extreme cru-
elty."5 A conditional resident need not prove extreme cruelty if she
demonstrates physical abuse. 6 Requiring women to demonstrate ex-
treme hardship reinforces the anti-fraud aspect of the Immigration Mar-
riage Fraud Amendments (IMFA), but does not adequately protect
abused women.47
1986, created a conditional residency status that attaches to every visa holder entering the
U.S. in a marriage of less than two years. See Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2(a), 100 Stat. 3537, 3541
(amending INA § 216 as codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(g)(1) (1994)). The conditional residency
requirement may be waived (1) where removal of the alien would cause extreme hardship; (2)
when a good faith marriage resulted in divorce; or (3) when a participant of a good faith mar-
riage has been battered or subject to extreme cruelty by the other. See INA § 216(c)(4), 8
U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (1994); see also Anderson, supra note 9, at 1411-13 (providing a more
detailed analysis of the IMFA).
42. See Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 701, 104 Stat. 4978, 5085-86 (1990) (amending INA §
216(c)(4) as codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (1994)). The IMMACT 90 changes authorized
the use of the hardship waivers to ameliorate potential harm caused by the adoption of the
conditional resident status. See id. However, the INS has yet to adopt a rule implementing
the portion of the VAWA that provides guidelines on the evidence to justify removal of con-
ditions on residence imposed under § 216. See 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 399, 400 (Apr. 1,
1996).
43. See INA § 216(c)(4)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (1994); see also 8 C.F.R. §
216.5(e)(3)(i) (1999) (listing examples of types of abuse and cruelty that will qualify under
this section). To obtain a waiver the alien must file Form 1-1751, Petition to Remove Condi-
tions on Residence. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(a)(1) (1999).
44. See INA § 216(c)(4).
45. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv)-(vii). For example, despite the clear mandate of
VAWA, the INS has not modified the regulations that require a report by a licensed mental
health professional to support a waiver based on extreme cruelty. See id; Sandra D. Press-
man, The Legal Issues Confronting Conditional Resident Aliens Who Are Victims of Domestic
Violence: Past, Present, and Future Perspectives, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129, 141-
45 (1994-95) (providing a critical analysis of these requirements); Margaret M.R. O'Herron,
Note, Ending the Abuse of the Marriage Fraud Act, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 549,555-59 (1993).
46. See INA § 216(c)(4)(c).
47. See Franco, supra note 9, at 122 (exploring the judicial and administrative meaning
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If the woman is a conditional resident who does not possess a strong
case of battery or abuse, she may obtain a good faith marriage or ex-
treme hardship waiver.4 To qualify for the good faith waiver, the appli-
cant must show the marriage has legally ended through divorce or an-
nulment.49  To qualify under the extreme hardship provision, the
applicant must demonstrate that the hardship occurred during the pe-
riod that the applicant was admitted on a conditional basis.'
Reviewing the anti-domestic violence actions adopted in the immi-
gration and criminal law demonstrates the relevance of these require-
ments. Part I further documents the methods of punishment adopted
in each of these areas.
III. THE PUNITIVE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The emergence of harsh penalties against the perpetrators of vio-
lence complicates an applicant's ability to qualify for the relief contem-
plated by the VAWA. While harsh penalties for perpetrators and the
VAWA specified standards for victims appear to be valid in obtaining
the safety of victims, these methods created problems rather than solu-
tions. Enhanced punitive approaches in criminal law intersect with the
relief espoused in immigration law, and the results for battered immi-
grant women can be disastrous.
A. Response to Domestic Violence in Immigration Law
In addition to the ameliorative victims' relief promulgated by the
of extreme hardship in VAWA cases); Teran, supra note 9, at nn.84-85 and accompanying
text (providing a critical analysis of extreme hardship requirements). The interim rule pro-
vides a good summary of the INS's thoughts on what will constitute extreme hardship. See 61
Fed. Reg. 13061, 13067 (1996). The following are factors which have been considered as rele-
vant in an extreme hardship determination:
(1) age of the person; (2) age and number of the person's children, and their ability
to speak the language and adjust to life in another country; (3) serious illness of the
person or his or her child which necessitates medical attention not adequately avail-
able in the foreign country; (4) person's inability to obtain employment in the for-
eign country; (5) person's and the person's child's length of residence in the United
States; (6) existence of other family members legally residing in the United States;
(7) irreparable harm that may arise as a result of disruption of educational opportu-
nities; and (8) adverse psychological impact of deportation.
Id. at 13067.
48. See INA § 216(c)(4)(A) & (B).
49. See INA § 216(c)(4)(B).
50. See INA § 216(c)(4).
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IMMACT 90 and the VAWA, Congress created new grounds for pun-
ishing abusers.5' Heightened immigration consequences for domestic
abuse were incorporated in the INA. Specifically, Congress (1) created
new grounds for deportation based on domestic violence and violation
of protection orders;- (2) expanded the aggravated felony definitions
which cover many acts of domestic abuse;53 and (3) adopted a new defi-
nition of conviction expanding the number of cases which can create ad-
verse immigration consequences.'
1. Domestic Violence Charges as Grounds of Deportation
The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) establishes a broad new ground of deportability based on
convictions of domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse as well as vio-
lations of civil or criminal protection orders.55 Any case which involves a
crime constituting "domestic violence" triggers immigration conse-
quences.5 Deportation can occur if the violence was directed at
a current or former spouse of the person, [or] an individual with
whom the person shares a child in common, [or] an individual
who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the person as
spouse, [or] an individual similarly situated to a spouse of the
person under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdic-
tion where the offense occurs .... 57
Violations of protection orders also create a ground of deportabil-
ity.' This deportation ground may stem from a violation of a civil or
criminal order if the order is entered by a court to protect "against
51. See VAWA, Pub. L. No. 103.322, § 40221, 108 Stat. 1902, 1926-1931 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2261-62 (1994)) (creating new crimes of Interstate Domestic Violence and Inter-
state Violation of Protection Order); Pamela A. Paziotopoulos, Violence Against Women Act:
Federal Relief for State Prosecutors, 30 PROSECUTOR 20, 23 (1996) (discussing the new laws
promulgated by VAWA).
52. See INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(e) (Supp. 111997).
53. See INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(43)(f) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
54. See INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (Supp. III 1997).
55. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 350, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639 to 640 (1996);
INA § 237(a)(2)(E) (incorporating the amendments of section 350 of the IIRIRA).
56. See INA § 237 (a)(E)(i).
57. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i) (incorporating the amendments of IIRIRA section 350(a)(i)).
58. See INA § 237(a)(E)(ii) (incorporating the amendments by IIRIRA section
350(a)(ii)).
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credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury.""
The provisions became effective with enactment of the IIRIRA on Sep-
tember 30, 1996 and are not retroactive. 60
2. Domestic Violence Charges as Aggravated Felonies
The most serious inmiigration consequences result to individuals
convicted of aggravated felonies.6' The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
created the category of crimes defined as aggravated felonies for immi-
gration purposes.' Since 1988, Congress expanded the list of aggravated
felonies to twenty-one subsections, each listing several different types of
crimes.63 The provisions are retroactive and apply to every qualifying
conviction entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996. The most
significant aggravated felony in the domestic violence context is a crime
of violence."
In 1990, Congress added crimes of violence to the list of aggravated
felonies.6 Section 321(a)(3) of the IIRIRA amended the provisions by
expanding the definitions to include crimes with a one-year sentence. 67
As defined in title 18 U.S.C. section 16, a crime of violence includes
both
an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or... a felony.., that, by its nature, involves a substan-
tial risk that force against the person or property of another may
59. Id.
60. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 350(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546,3009-640 (1996) (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997)) (directing that the provisions only apply to
convictions after the enactment date, September 30,1996).
61. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. III 1997). Aggra-
vated felons are subject to deportation with a twenty-year bar to reentry into the United
States. See id.; INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(9)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1997). This
ground does not preclude admission for an aggravated felon, however, an individual who is
removed from the United States due to a conviction for an aggravated felony is barred from
reentry. See INA §212(a)(9)(A)(ii). In addition, reentry without a waiver by the Attorney
General is a federal criminal offense with a punishment of a fine and/or a twenty year prison
sentence. See INA § 276(a)(2) & (b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) & (b)(2) (Supp. III 1997).
62. See Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7341-7350, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-73 (1988) (codified as
amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994)).
63. See INA § 101(a)(43)(A)-(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) (1994).
64. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(c), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 (1996) (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. III 1997)).
65. See INA § 101(a)(43)(F).
66. See IMMACT 90, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978,5048 (1990).
67. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321 (a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-546,3009-627 (1996).
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be used in the course of committing the offense."
Under the definition, the first form of violence is not limited to "fel-
ony" convictions. State misdemeanor offenses, including domestic vio-
lence offenses which meet all of the requirements of the definition, may
also be an aggravated felony under the immigration laws.6
Although the IMMACT 90 required an imposed sentence of more
than five years for aggravated felony status,70 the IIRIRA reduced the
five-year sentence to one year.1 Furthermore, any sentence given by
the court is considered to be "imposed," even if it is not served.7 Be-
cause the amendments apply to convictions entered on, after, or before
the passage of the IIRIRA, they apply retroactively.'
Under the current law, prior convictions of a charge now considered
an aggravated felony, trigger adverse immigration consequences. '4 Fur-
thermore, as long as a crime involves violence against the person or
property of another, and a one-year sentence is imposed, the crime is an
aggravated felony for immigration purposes.
5
Prior to this expansion of the aggravated felony definition, deporta-
tion for criminal conduct often turned on an adjudication of an act as
one which involved moral turpitude.7 6 Traditionally, the BIA did not
68. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1994).
69. See Cecelia M. Espenoza, Crimes of Violence by Non-Citizens and the Immigration
Consequences, 26 COLO. LAW. 89, 89 & n.8 (1997); Maricela Garcia, Commentary, Mixing of
Laws Can Yield Injustice, CHI. TRIB., June 3,1998, at 18, available in 1998 WL 2862542.
70. See IMMACT 90, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978,5048 (1990).
71. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321 (a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 (1996);
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (Supp. III 1997) (incorporating the amend-
ment by section 321(a)(3) of the IIRIRA).
72. See INA § 101(a)(48)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (Supp. 111997).
73. However, the amendments only apply to immigration actions taken "after the date
of enactment," which was September 30, 1996. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
(Supp. III 1997). Therefore, immigration proceedings instituted before September 30, 1996
must be re-filed or amended to have the broader aggravated felony provisions affect an alien.
See id
74. See In re Lettman, BIA Pub. 3370, Inv. No. A17-599-144 (Nov. 5, 1998), available in
1998 WL 811588 (finding an alien subject to deportation for a conviction of an aggravated
felony regardless of the date of the conviction).
75. See INA § 101(a)(43)(F). The IIRIRA amended the prior law regarding what con-
stitutes a conviction, making it clear that any reference to a term of imprisonment "is deemed
to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered... regardless of any suspen-
sion...." INA § 101(a)(48)(B) (codifying the amendment by section 322 of the IIRIRA Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 322(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 (1996)).
76. Lawfully admitted aliens can lose their immigration status and be deported either on
a single conviction for a crime of moral turpitude committed within five-years of entry, or two
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consider simple assaults as crimes of moral turpitude and, therefore,
convictions did not lead to deportation.' In 1996, the Board of Immi-
gration of Appeals determined that a corporal act of violence directed
against a spouse, co-habitant or parent of the perpetrator's child is a
crime of moral turpitude.78 This holding, however, does not extend de-
portation consequences to all domestic violence cases and the BIA con-
tinues to evaluate each case to determine whether moral turpitude ex-
ists.' In immigration proceedings initiated after April 24, 1996, a crime
of moral turpitude is any crime that may carry with it a sentence of one
year.8
°
moral turpitude crimes at any time. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 1111997). This section of the INA defines a crime of moral turpi-
tude as:
(i)Crimes of moral turpitude
Any alien who-
(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or
10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under sec-
tion 245(j) of this title) after the date of admission, and
(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be im-
posed is deportable.
(ii) Multiple criminal convictions
Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes in-
volving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions
were in a single trial, is deportable.
Id.
77. In Toutounjian v. INS, a district court reviewed the history of assault as a crime of
moral turpitude: "The crime of moral turpitude includes a broad spectrum of misconduct,
ranging from relatively minor offenses, e.g., simple assault, to serious offenses, e.g., assault
with a deadly weapon." 959 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). Some decisions have found
that moral turpitude is not an element of simple assault. See, e.g., Matter of Short, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 136, 139 (BIA 1989); but see Matter of Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 699, 670 (BIA 1988)
(stating that assault "may or may not involve moral turpitude" and finding aggravated assault
to be a crime of moral turpitude).
78. See In re Tran, BIA Pub. 3271, Inv. No. A28-005-431 (Mar. 28, 1996) (holding that a
conviction for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, contrary to a California statute, consti-
tuted a conviction of a crime of moral turpitude); accord Grageda v. United States, 12 F.3d
919, 929 (9' Cir. 1993) (holding willful infliction upon a spouse of corporal injury resulting in
a traumatic condition is a crime of moral turpitude).
79. See, e.g., In the Matter of B., 5 I. & N. Dec. 538, 539-41 (BIA 1953) (holding that
simple assault on a police officer is not a crime of moral turpitude); In the Matter of 0., 4 1. &
N. Dec. 301,307 (BIA 1951) (holding that rioting accompanied by assault of an official is not
a crime of moral turpitude); In the Matter of P., 3 I. & N. Dec. 5, 6-7 (BIA 1947) (holding
crime of assault with intent to do great bodily harm is not crime of moral turpitude).
80. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 435, 110 Stat. 1214, 1274-75 (1996) (amending
INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1257 (a)(2)(i)(II) (1994)). Prior to the AEDPA the stat-
1999]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Although a single crime of moral turpitude does not lead to deporta-
tion unless the conviction occurred within five years of entry,8 ' and a
criminal defendant charged with a misdemeanor domestic violence of-
fense is not subject to the new domestic violence ground of deportability
unless the offense occurred on or after September 30, 1996,2 most sim-
ple assaults, even misdemeanors, are defined for immigration purposes
as aggravated felonies because they are crimes of violence.' The result
is that a simple assault directed against an intimate has escalated from
an offense that, absent extreme circumstances, was not even a crime of
moral turpitude, to a crime that may be an aggravated felony, which
causes severe limitations on eligibility for relief under VAWA.
3. New Definition of Conviction
Importantly, IIRIRA changed the definition of "conviction."' 0 Pre-
viously, a crime did not constitute a "final conviction" unless the convic-
tion met a three-prong test, which included a guilty or nolo contendere
plea, the imposition of some form of punishment or limitation in liberty,
and a judgment or adjudication of guilt or innocence." Today, a convic-
tion is defined for immigration purposes as follows:
a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court, or if
adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where -
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has en-
tered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted suffi-
cient facts to warrant a finding of guilt; and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or
restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed.?6
Furthermore, the BIA determined that for immigration purposes de-
ferred adjudications are final convictions. The new definition of "con-
viction" allows the INS to argue that a conviction is final, notwithstand-
ute required the imposition of a one year sentence. See INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C.
1257 (a)(2)(i)(II) (1994).
81. See INA § 237 (a)(2)(A)(i).
82 See INA § 237 (a)(2)(A).
83. See INA § 101 (a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (Supp. III 1997).
84. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 322, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 to 629 (1996)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(48)(A) (Supp. III 1997)).
85. See Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 549 n.4 (BIA 1988) (citing Matter of L-R,
8 I. & N. Dec. 269 (BIA 1959)).
86. INA § 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (Supp. III 1997).
87. See In re Punu, BIA Pub. 3271, Inv. No. A72-423-857, at 6 (Aug. 18, 1998).
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ing post conviction relief, provided that there is something on record to
support the conviction.' As a result, an immigrant faces a dilemma. If
the immigrant accepts an offer of diversion and makes an admission on
the record, she has a conviction for immigration purposes.
In addition, the provision defining "a term of imprisonment" as that
time ordered by a court89 greatly expands the number of cases which
carry a term of imprisonment of more than one year and therefore in-
creases the number of cases that qualify as aggravated felonies. ' This
change, in conjunction with the new aggravated felony definition means
that many crimes of domestic violence are now aggravated felonies. As
noted above, this creates a potential bar to VAWA relief which does not
exist for other visa applicants." In the typical case, a new aggravated
felony conviction would render an applicant deportable, but would not
make them inadmissible. Therefore, non-VAWA applicants are al-
lowed to adjust their status, while the VAWA applicant's visa can be
denied on the ground of lack of good moral character. The good moral
character requirement which exists for VAWA applicants creates an ad-
verse and uneven result.
B. Response to Domestic Violence in the Criminal Justice System
In addition to the VAWA immigration provisions, Congress adopted
several new criminal sanctions as a general response to domestic vio-
lenceY The VAWA criminal provisions exemplify a larger trend to ex-
pand criminal laws dealing with abusers of women and children. The
88. In a recent decision, an immigration judge held that "[t]he withdrawing of the re-
spondent's plea and entering of a nolo contendere plea to a misdemeanor does not alter the
fact of the state felony conviction because, again, of the change in what constitutes a convic-
tion under immigration law." Matter of Galan, BIA Pub., Inv. No. A13-103-690, at 6 (July 8,
1998) (decision on file with the author.)
89. See NA § 101(a)(48)(B).
90. See INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(F) (Supp. III 1997) (defining
crimes of violence with a term of imprisonment of more than one year as an aggravated felo-
nies).
91. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
92. See George B. Stevenson, Federal Antiviolence and Abuse Legislation: Toward
Elimination of Disparate Justice for Women and Children, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 847, 855-
903 (1997) (providing a review of other recent congressional acts to combat violence against
women and children); Jenny Rivera, Intimate Partner Violence Strategies: Models for Com-
munity Participation, 50 ME. L. REV. 283, 284-85 (1998) (providing a more comprehensive
review of the criminal provisions adopted in the VAWA); Paziotopoulos, supra note 51, pas-
sim.
93. See Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Vio-
lence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853,853 n.1
(1994); see generally Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction to DOMESTIC
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intent of this shift in philosophy has been driven by advocates' desire to
protect the victims of domestic violence. 4
The shared underlying concern of all of these efforts is to decrease
adverse impacts of domestic violence.95 However, the proponents of
these various approaches have failed to evaluate how the intersection of
the approaches can, and do, cause problems rather than relief for immi-
grant victims of domestic violence.6 The following sections discuss sev-
eral of the criminal law reforms that have been adopted to combat do-
mestic violence.
1. Mandatory Arrest and Other Police Policies
Preceded by the adoption of laws which allow "warrantless arrests
when there is probable cause in misdemeanor domestic violence inci-
dents,"' mandatory arrest statutes occurred as a response to the Min-
neapolis Domestic Violence Experiment.8 This experiment tested three
different approaches by police to domestic violence calls and concluded
that arrest was the most effective.99 The authors of the report, however,
urged the adoption of a pro-arrest, not a mandatory arrest, policy.0°
The Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence endorsed
the finding of the report and also encouraged a pro-arrest policy."0'
VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE, vii-xviii (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl
G.Buzawa eds., 1992).
94. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1850, 1870 (1996) [hereinafter Hanna, No Right to
Choose]. "In the domestic violence context, the goal is to punish the batterer in order to pro-
tect the potential victims." Id.
95. See, e.g., Holly Heyser, Domestic Abuse Convictions Rise Under New Law's Power,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT & THE LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), May 2,1998, at Al (noting that the
goal of new Virginia domestic violence law was to reduce the incidence of domestic abuse).
96. See Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 1265 (discussing "the intersectional differences of
women of color" in the context of the movement against domestic violence). Crenshaw dis-
cusses the adverse impacts that a white feminist agenda has on the provision of services to
women of color who are also victims of domestic violence. See id.
97. Miriam H. Ruttenberg, Note, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis
of Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. UJ. GENDER & L. 171, 180 (1994).
98. See JEFFREY FAGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 12-13 (1995) (discussing the study conducted
by Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk).
99. See id. at 12.
100. See id.
101. See id. The use of mandatory arrests emerged alter the 1984 United States Attor-
ney General's Task Force on Family Violence report recommended that arrest be the pre-
ferred policy in dealing with domestic violence incidents. See Nancy Egan, The Police Re-
sponse to Spouse Abuse: An Annotated Bibliography (visited August 20, 1999)
<http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/research/ spouse/html>; see also Joan Zorza, Criminal Law: The
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However, anti-domestic violence advocates used the report and recom-
mendation to argue for the adoption of mandatory arrest laws."~ Cur-
rently, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
use some form of mandatory arrest policy in a domestic violence situa-
tion."
Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence: 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 46, 53-60 (1992) (discussing the legal strategy pursued by domestic violence
advocates in an effort to remedy inadequate police response to domestic violence).
102. See generally Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy
Implications of New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929 (1994)
(providing a thorough examination of the Minneapolis Experiment and the replication studies
that followed) [hereinafter Zorza, Must We Stop]. See also Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa,
Introduction to DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE, xii-
xiii (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G.Buzawa eds., 1992) (describing the historical development of
the police response to domestic violence).
103. Some states require across-the-board mandatory arrest. See ALASKA STAT. §
18.65.530 (Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.6 (West 1999); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46B-38B (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19-A § 4012 (West 1998) (requiring arrest in cases of violation of court orders and aggravated
assault); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §171.137 (Michie 1997);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173:B9 (1994) (leaves arrest to the discretion of the officer); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4) (Consol. Supp.
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § SOB-4; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8 § 638 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-
3 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-21 (Michie 1998); UTAH CODE UNANN. § 77-36-
2.2(26) (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2.81.3 (Michie Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.31.100 (West Supp. 1999); WIs. STAT. § 968.075(26) (1997).
Certain states require a mandatory arrest only in certain situations. See ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring mandatory arrest if physical injury or
deadly weapon is involved); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2) (West 1994) (requiring mandatory
arrest when abuse results in injury or where weapon is involved); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
403.760(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1998) (requiring mandatory arrest for violation of protection or-
der); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(1)(2) (West 1999) (requiring mandatory arrest when
officer believes that there is impending danger or commission of aggravated or second degree
battery); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A § 6(7) (West 1998) (mandatory for violation of court
orders and aggravated assaults); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 776.22 (West Supp. 1999) (re-
quiring police departments to establish policies reflecting that in most domestic abuse calls
should result in arrest); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085 (West 1997) (requiring mandatory arrest if
probable cause exists that there is a violation of a protective order or if there was a previous
incident within the past twelve hours); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-928 (1998) (requiring manda-
tory arrest if probable cause exists that there is a violation of a protective order); N. J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C.25-21 (1998) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.032 (Anderson 1996) (re-
quiring local agencies to establish policies requiring arrest where the offender knowingly
caused or attempted to cause serious physical harm); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310 (1997) (re-
quiring mandatory arrest if protective order exists or if accused is on release from a recent
domestic violence incident); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 6113(a) (West Supp. 1999) (re-
quiring mandatory arrest if protective order exists); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70(B) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1998) (requiring mandatory arrest if injury has occurred); TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
ANN. art. 14.03(b) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring mandatory arrest if probable cause that pro-
tective order was violated).
There are three states that indicate preferred arrest policy. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:163
In the mandatory arrest states, the law requires an arrest if there is
any evidence of a committed assault. The laws remove responsibility for
filing criminal charges from the victim, and, thus, limit the discretion of
the police."° According to anti-domestic violence advocates, mandatory
arrest policies promote the safety of the victim and limit the liabilities of
police departments. 5
In addition, they argue that mandatory arrest is a strong deterrent to
domestic violence.1 6 Opponents note that the Spouse Assault Replica-
tion Program (SARP) studies," which attempted to replicate the Min-
neapolis Experiment, failed to provide any consistent results, and did
not support the initial findings that arrest is the most effective method of
dealing with perpetrators.'O' Furthermore, commentators found not only
that arrest of abusers fails to have a deterrent effect, but that it may in
fact increase repeat violence,' ° especially over time and with unem-
ployed batterers."0
A second concern raised by opponents of mandatory arrest is the in-
crease of dual arrests in many jurisdictions."' Even where a police de-
partment imposes a mandatory or preferred arrest strategy, police "offi-
cers who embrace victim-blaming, perpetrator-exculpating perspectives
routinely resist the directive and either arrest both parties or conclude
6-311(2)(a) (1997) (in cases of injury, weapon, imminent danger, or a restraining order viola-
tion); N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-10(1) (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-619(a)
(1996). For a similar listing of statutes current through 1994, see Ruttenberg, supra note 97, at
180 n.44.
104. See Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic
Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 533, 534; Pamela Blass Bracher, Comment,
Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: The City of Cincinnati's Simple Solution to a Com-
plex Problem, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 155,170 (1996).
105. See Wanless, supra note 104, at 538. Courts have held police departments liable
when they failed to act in domestic violence situations. See Bracher, supra note 104, at 162-
65; Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime against the State: The Need
for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 651-55 (1997); Wanless, supra note
104, at 538-39; Zorza, Must We Stop, supra note 102, at 935 (discussing the legal challenges
vhich prompted changes in police department responses to domestic violence).
106. See Wanless, supra note 104, at 552-53.
107. This is the name for the replication studies conducted in five jurisdictions. See Fa-
gan, supra note 98, at 14. The following five jurisdictions have produced reports, Colorado
Springs, Colorado; Dade County, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Omaha, Nebraska; and
Charlotte, North Carolina. See Zorza, Must We Stop, supra note 102, at 929.
108. See Fagan, supra note 98, at 13.
109. See Hoctor, supra note 105, at 657, 682.
110. See Zorza, Must We Stop, supra note 102, at 929, 967-68 (responding to opponents
of mandatory arrest law who claim arrest does not deter unemployed abusers).
111. See Wanless, supra note 104, at 565 ("[a] dual arrest occurs when the victim is ar-
rested along with her abuser"); see also infra, notes 145-46.
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that probable cause does not exist to believe that the accused has com-
mitted the crime alleged.', 12 To counteract this tendency, some laws ad-
dress a mutual aggressor's situation by adopting language which limits
arrests to the "primary aggressor." ' In addition, the VAWA encour-
ages states to adopt mandatory arrest policies and discourages the use of
dual arrest practices.1
However, even in jurisdictions where the officers are advised to ar-
rest the "primary aggressor," immigrant women and women of color are
disadvantaged. Where the determination of the primary aggressor is not
defined narrowly, discretion is restored to the police, and this adversely
affects immigrant women." When the determination of who is the ag-
112. Barbara J. Hart, Arrest" What's the Big Deal, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207,
210 (1997).
113. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring probable
cause that both parties independently committed the act, excluding acts in self defense); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 836(3) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that where dual protective orders exist the
officer shall make reasonable efforts to identify and arrest the primary physical aggressor);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.6(2) (West 1999) (mandating that complaints from two or
more persons shall be evaluated separately); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29(4)(b) (West Supp.
1999) (stating that arrest is the preferred response with respect to the primary aggressor and
not the person who acts reasonably in self defense); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12 (West 1994)
(ordering that the officer arrest the primary physical aggressor if there is an injury, intent to
inflict serious injury, or a firearm); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 594B(d)(2) (1996) (stating that if
there is mutual battery the officer shall consider who the primary aggressor is and who may
have acted in self defense); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A § 6(e) (West 1997) (requiring
that in the case of dual arrest, every officer must set forth reasons for the dual arrest); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 776.223(b)(ii) (West Supp. 1999) (setting forth the criteria to be evalu-
ated when determining whether to arrest one or both parties); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(3)
(West 1997) (stating that the officer shall arrest primary aggressor and consider intent of ac-
cused, history of abuse, and extent of the injury); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2)(6) (1997)
(stating that factors to consider when determining the primary physical aggressor include the
prior history of domestic violence, the severity of the injuries, whether an act was done in self
defense, and the size and strength of each person.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:9 (1994)
(directing the officer to arrest the primary physical aggressor); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW §
140.10(4)(c) (Consol. Supp. 1999) (directing the officer to arrest the primary aggressor, to
consider the extent of injuries, whether the person is threatening or in the future will be
threatening, and whether the person acted in self defense); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(c)(2)
(1994) (directing arrest of primary physical aggressor); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70(D) (Law
Co-op. Supp. 1998) (stating that when determining who the primary aggressor is, the officer
shall consider the history of abuse, the severity of injuries, the evidence, the likelihood of fu-
ture injury, and whether one party acted in self defense); UTAH CODE UNANN. § 77-36-2.2(3)
(1998) (requiring the officer, when arresting the primary aggressor, to consider prior com-
plaints, the severity of the injury, and whether one party acted in self defense).
114. See VAWA, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 2101(c), 108 Stat. 1902, 1932 (1994) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c) (1994)); see also Stevenson, supra note 92, at 889-90 (discussing re-
quirements under the "Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies" and the VAWA provisions, 42
U.S.C. § 10415(b)(3)(A) (1994)).
115. See Vicky Stefter and Donna Lewen, Editorial, The Vulnerability of Immigrant
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gressor is left to the discretion of the police, even well-trained officers
fall into old patterns of assessing this status and may determine that the
immigrant woman is the aggressor.
Police, as part of society, bring long-standing attitudes to incidents
which unfavorably portray immigrant women.16  Such attitudes may
cause law enforcement to perceive the woman as having an "angry de-
meanor" and to be more likely to believe the man when determining
which of the two is the aggressor."" Once the credibility of one of the
partners becomes an issue, the immigrant woman, who has less familiar-
ity with the language and legal process, is disadvantaged in comparison
to male perpetrators who are United States citizens or legal permanent
residents with more established ties to the United States.1 , Further-
more, police officers resistant to domestic violence claims may tell the
parties that a return to the scene could lead to a dual arrest."9
Women, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at B5. The story of Susana Blackwell illustrates
the perception which attaches and harms immigrant women. See id. Susana was shot to
death by her estranged husband in the King County Courthouse while she was seeking legal
protection from him. See id. News reports following her death by her husband labeled her a
"mail order" bride and declared "'Gunman felt duped by bride from the start.'" Id. The dis-
paraging remarks seemed to shift the responsibility from the gunman to his victim. See id.
This shift demonstrates how an abuser's depiction can diminish the victim's ability to obtain
relief. Id.
116. See Donald G. Dutton, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 219 (1995). Dutton explains that the police have the
same general perceptions as the rest of society with regard to domestic violence situations
which affects how they deal with domestic violence situations. See generally id. at 218-249.
117. Liza Mundy, Fault Line In Virginia: The enduring problem of domestic violence has
a new solution: an unforgiving law that in its first four months has led to the arrests of thou-
sands of husbands, wives and parents, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1997, (Magazine) at 11,
available in 1997 WL 14709247 at *8 (discussing police attitudes in context of domestic vio-
lence in general and not necessarily all women).
118. See ROBERT C. DAVIS AND EDNA EREz, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRANT
POPULATIONS AS VICTIMS: TOWARDS A MULTICULTURAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 3-4
(May 1998); see also Karin Wang, Comment, Battered Asian American Women: Community
Responses from the Battered Women's Movement and the Asian American Community, 3
ASIAN LJ. 151, 162-63 (1996) (describing a case where a husband who spoke English well
accused the woman of attacking him).
119. In response to complaints about these procedures some states that have instituted
laws that prevent officers from threatening or suggesting future arrests of parties involved
that may prevent the parties from reporting future incidents. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46b-38b(b) (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20.1(a) (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209A § 6(c) (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085 (West 1997); N.D. CENT.
CODE §14-07.1-10(2) (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70(E) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1998); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-619(d)(1) (1996); UTAH CODE UNANN. § 77-36-2.2(4) (Lexis 1998).
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2. Mandatory Prosecution and "No Drop" Policies
Problems with the methodology of the Minneapolis Experiment and
negative findings in the SARP replication studies tended to reduce the
belief in the effectiveness of mandatory arrest policies standing alone.
Advocates argued that the result was a shift in discretion from the police
to the prosecutors and that such policies unnecessarily placed responsi-
bility for arrest and prosecution with the victim." In response advo-
cates pushed for mandatory prosecution and "no-drop" policies, in or-
der to remove charging decisions from the victims.'
These policies are characterized as either "soft" or "hard" no-drop
policies." In soft no-drop jurisdictions, the victim need not file a com-
plaint in order to initiate criminal proceedings against an abuser." In-
stead, the prosecutor files the charges.2 4 In addition, there are no ad-
verse consequences taken against a victim who refuses to cooperate
after the charges are filed.'2 The efforts of the state remain focused on
supporting and empowering the victim to follow through with the prose-
cution.26
In contrast, under hard no-drop prosecution policies, prosecutors are
obliged to try even those cases in which the victims do not willingly par-
ticipate.'2 To pursue the prosecution, victims are subpoenaed against
their will, may be prosecuted if they recant, or held in contempt if they
120. See Robert C. Davis and Barbara Smith, Domestic Violence Reforms: Empty
Promises of Fulfilled Expectations, 41 CRIME AND DELINQ. 541, 546 (1995).
121. See Hanna, No Right to Choos supra note 94, at 1860-65; Wanless, supra note 104,
at 572.
122. See Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra note 94, at 1863; Naomi R. Cahn, Innovative
Approaches to the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Crimes: An Overview in, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE, 161,166 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl
G. Buzawa, eds., 1992).
123. See Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra note 94, at 1863; Cahn supra note 117, at 168.
124. The shifting of responsibility signals that the crime is one against society and the
individual victim, not just the victim. See Cahn supra note 122, at 166.
125. See Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra note 94, at 1867 (noting that "the predomi-
nant prosecution strategy centers around eliciting the victim's testimony").
126. See id at 1863; Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System, in
Do ARRESTS & RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 98 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, eds.,
1996) (providing an overview of how the victim can be treated all stages in the criminal justice
system).
127. See Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra note 94, at 1863 (arguing that an intermedi-
ate policy should be adopted). Professor Hanna states that the forced testimony of abuse vic-
tims should be confined to actions in which the testimony is needed for a successful prosecu-
tion, and the focus should be on improving alternative methods of prosecution that are not so
dependent on the testimony of the spouse. See id at 1899.
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refuse to testify." In some jurisdictions, mandatory prosecution laws
are generating uncompromising attitudes in police and prosecutors' of-
fices. For example, in Virginia Beach, prosecutors declare that,
"'[w]e're not going to drop the charges just because the victim wants
to."" 29 This approach increased the number of guilty pleas in domestic
violence cases."
In some circumstances, the abuser takes a plea to avoid placing their
partner in the position of testifying or being placed in jail. Unfortu-
nately, a plea undertaken for these reasons does not address the under-
lying causes of domestic violence and fails to resolve the power imbal-
ance which is present in the relationship. As a result of a plea, the
complexity of domestic violence situations is lost, and the prosecutor in
a no-drop jurisdiction becomes driven by the desire to obtain a disposi-
tion. Opponents of the mandatory prosecution schemes argue that the
aggressive approach of many prosecutors has the negative effect of re-
victimizing the abused woman."'
Many prosecutors respond to all victims as if they will drop
charges." This dynamic creates an adversarial position between the
state and woman victim, and may even reinforce the emotional ties be-
tween the abuser and the victim.' The forceful treatment of the victim
by the state gives the abuser more leverage to use in keeping the woman
from reporting the incident in the first place.'
128. See Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra note 94, at 1866 (describing the actions of the
Anchorage prosecutors in 1983 who, under a hard no-drop policy, jailed Maudie Wall over-
night when she refused to testify against her husband); Gena L. Durham, Note, The Domestic
Violence Dilemma: How Our Ineffective and Varied Responses Reflect Our Conflicted Views
of the Problem, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 650 (1998).
129. Heyser, supra note 95.
130. See Bill McKeown, Closing up Legal Seams/Family Violence Laws Often Fall Short,
THE COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al (Colorado Springs Judge
Rebecca Bromley stating that about ninety percent of defendants take a plea bargain). In
addition, the evidentiary standards in domestic violence cases are relaxed to the point that an
accused man is presumed guilty. See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and
Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1516 (1998) [hereinafter
Hanna, The Paradox of Hope].
131. See Richard J. Gelles & Murray A. Straus, Compassion or Contro" Legal, Social,
and Medical Services in INTIMATE VIOLENCE 172-80 (1988) (concluding that mandatory
prosecution policies disempower the victims as they take the control of the situation out of
their hands). See also Hoctor, supra note 105, at 685.
132. See Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra notes 94, at 1894-98 (addressing no-drop
policy opponents' concerns about revictinization); Durham, supra note 128, at 651-53.
133. See Durham, supra note 128, at 652 (arguing that actions of the prosecutor may act
to increase control by the abuser).
134. See id. at 653. As one commentator notes, "[p]erversely, in all too many cases, the
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Fundamentally, he is able to tell her that she will be subject to arrest,
or deportation, if she reports the incident. Against the backdrop of fear
and coercion directed by the state toward the victims of domestic vio-
lence, the drop in the numbers of reports of domestic violence may re-
flect the sense of hopelessness that exists for the abused woman who
sees the state as just as great a threat as her abuser. 5 Furthermore, im-
migrant women who have escaped regimes which were oppressive or
unwilling to address domestic violence are especially wary of promises
made by the state.'m Finally, many scholars have demonstrated that
women of color experience the criminal justice system differently than
white women and have more to fear from contact with authority.'3
Opponents of mandatory prosecution also argue that an approach
which compels the testimony of the victim does little to eliminate the
negative stereotypes that are held by the public about victims of domes-
tic violence." Compelled testimony is perceived as untruthful and this
feeds into the tendency of the public to either minimize the harm or
blame the victim for her harm.39
The increased attention to domestic violence creates an atmosphere
where prosecutors are reluctant to negotiate cases involving allegations
of domestic abuse.' ° The desire to obtain a conviction keeps the prose-
cutor from the traditional role of evaluating each case and using good
judgment.'41 The consequence of this shift has adverse ramifications in
both immigration and criminal law. The realities of many battered im-
effect of mandatory policies is to align the battered woman with her batterer, to protect him,
and to further entrench her in the abusive relationship." Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight:
A New Job Description for the Battered Woman's Prosecutor and Other More Modest Propos-
als, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 183,190-91 (1997).
135. See Durham, supra note 128, at 653.
136. See Virtue, Extreme Hardship, supra note 18, at 5.
137. See Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Class, and the Politics of the Battered Women's
Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 287, 291-296 (1997) (providing an excellent
discussion of the complexities that exist for battered women). See also Pat Swift, At the Inter-
section of Racial Politics and Domestic Abuse, BUFF. NEws, Dec. 27, 1997, at B7, available in
1997 WL 6483032.
138. See Durham, supra note 128, at 653-54 (noting that the tendency to blame the vic-
tim is enhanced in minority communities).
139. See Durham supra note 128, at 657.
140. See generally Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution,
7 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 173 (1997) (providing an example of the aggressive approach of one
veteran prosecutor).
141. See Pilcher, supra note 31, at 331 (quoting the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE-PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2 (1993) and
noting that according to the ABA standards, the prosecutor's duty is "'to seek justice, not
merely to convict'").
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migrant women are directly impacted by the introductioni of these harsh
penalties designed by Congress to assist them.
A second consequence of the use of mandatory arrest, prosecution
and "no drop" policies is the heavy penalization of perpetrators in an ef-
fort to "protect" female victims.' 42 A similar intent emerges in immigra-
tion through the enactment of a new ground for deportation which ap-
plies to both criminal violations of domestic violence laws,43 and civil
and criminal violations of domestic violence orders.'"
For women seeking assistance the availability of relief may be mini-
mal given the inadequate training of law enforcement officers. In juris-
dictions where women do seek the assistance of the police, many are
told that they will also be subject to arrest.145 In jurisdictions which al-
142. See Fagan, supra note 98, at 39; Fedders, supra note 137, at 289; and see also Hanna,
No Right to Choose supra note 94.
143. See INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (Supp. III 1997). Section
237 of the INA defines "crime of domestic violence" as
any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, of the United States Code)
against a person committed by a current or former spouse of the person, by an indi-
vidual with whom the person shares a child in common, by an individual who is co-
habitating with or has cohabited with the person as a spouse, by an individual simi-
larly situated to a spouse of the person under the domestic or family violence laws of
the jurisdiction where the offense occurs, or by any other individual against a person
who is protected from that individual's acts under the domestic or family violence
laws of the United States or any state, Indian tribal government, or unit of local gov-
ernment.
Id.
144. See INA § 237 (a)(2)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (Supp. III 1997). Section
237 of the INA defines "protection order" as
any injunction issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of
domestic violence, including temporary or final orders issued by civil or criminal
courts (other than support or child custody orders or provisions) whether obtained
by filing an independent action or as a pendente lite order in another proceeding.
Id.
145. For example, a Missouri statute requires that "if the police are called back within
twelve hours of the first call, someone must be arrested." Gail S. Zarosa, When Battered
Women Strike Back, 7 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 102, 101 (1996-97). Standing alone,
this requirement creates a disincentive to call the police. She may view the statement as a
threat that she will be arrested. See Zorza, supra note 97 at 966 (noting that in Milwaukee, a
similar warning was issued that "would surely have intimidated many of the victims from ever
calling the police again"). See also Lynn Gillin, Letter to the Editor, Analyzing the Issues in
Battered Women Cases, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 21,1997, at B6 available
in 1997 WL 4211225.
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low for dual arrests, or where the woman appears less credible in the
eyes of the police, seeking assistance to document a VAWA claim is im-
possible, as it creates a situation where the woman will be arrested and
subsequently detected by the INS.
In these circumstances, the victim's unwillingness to seek or find re-
lief can be attributed to an underlying failure in the policy formulation
to consider the impact these solutions to domestic violence may have onimmigrants, especially women of color. Policymakers have not ade-
quately considered the impact that this intersection of criminal and im-
migration law has on immigrant women of color.' 46 As a result, current
solutions do not treat the complexity of the choices facing immigrant
women.
IV. THE COLLISION COURSE FOR JUSTICE
Domestic violence advocates, and the policies that they urge, assume
women are victims and men are perpetrators." In fact, domestic vio-
lence advocates note that ninety-four percent of abuse is male against
female." The application of aggressive anti-domestic violence laws,
however, has caught many unintended victims in its net. In jurisdictions
which have adopted mandatory arrest policies, the arrests of women for
domestic violence have increased dramatically.'49
In Tarrant County, Texas, ten to fifteen percent of the domestic
violence cases each year involve female defendants.'" In Los Angeles,
the rate has more than doubled in five years, and women accounted for
146. This problem is related to, but distinct from, the issues raised by Crenshaw when
she describes the particular "intersectional" needs of women of color. See generally Cren-
shaw, supra note 7,'at 1265. Crenshaw discusses the adverse impacts that a white feminist
agenda has on the provision of services to women of color who are also victims of domestic
violence. See id. at 1265. More importantly, attempts to criminalize domestic violence fail to
recognize the unique situation of immigrant women and have caused related conflicts.
147. See Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ig-
nored, 11 LAW & INEQ. J.L. 1, 14 (1992) (arguing that a civil rights model should be adopted
to move away from the use of "victim" to define a "battered woman").
148. See Zorza, Must We Stop, supra note 102, at 980 (citing Angela Browne, WHEN
BATTERED WOMEN KILL 8 (1987)).
149. See John Johnson, A New Side to Domestic Violence: Arrests of women have risen
sharply since passage of tougher laws; critics say some men manipulate the system - others say
female abusers have long been overlooked, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at Al, available in 1996
WL 5263963 (quoting Joan Zorza); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal
Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2163-64 (1995) (observing that an abused woman may be ar-
rested in mandatory jurisdictions if the partner alleges that she hit him).
150. See Nancy Donisi, Domestic Abusers Brought to Justice: New laws reflect changing
attitudes, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, Apr. 21,1998, at 1A, available in 1998 WL 2530192.
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14.3% of the domestic arrests made in 1995.'"' These findings are consis-
tent with a 1998 study conducted by the National Institute of Justice that
found between ten and fifteen percent of those arrested for battering
are women.
152
In several jurisdictions, the SARP studies found an increase in the
number of women arrested after the adoption of mandatory arrest poli-
cies.' 53 This trend has also adversely affected immigrant women, who
are likely to be women of color. Given dual arrests occur when there is
doubt about who is the primary aggressor, and because the police act in
ways which discriminate against female complainants in low status areas
where immigrant women of color reside, women of color are arrested
more often than educated women who do not fit into stereotypes as
abusers."
In fact, many immigrant women of color get caught in a no-win
situation. The power dynamic precludes them from seeking outside as-
sistance, and when they finally do affirmatively seek assistance, they are
viewed as aggressive and considered the abuser. Their vulnerability is
also exacerbated by the male partner's ability to negotiate the criminal
justice system.'
151. See Johnson, supra note 149.
152. See KERRY HEALEY, ET. AL., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Batterer Intervention: Pro-
gram Approaches and Criminal Justice Strategies 5 (1998) [hereinafter Batterer Intervention
Report].
153. See Zorza, Must We Stop, supra note 102, at 980-81 (noting that the percentage of
female offenders "varied from 2% in Minneapolis, 4% in Omaha, 9% in Milwaukee, 11% in
Colorado Springs, and to 18% in Charlotte").
154. See Christine E. Rasche, Minority Women and Domestic Violence: The Unique Di-
lemmas of Battered Women of Color, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WOMEN,
OFFENDERS, VICTIMS & WORKERS 246, 254 (Barbara Raffel Price & Natalie J. Sokoloff,
eds., 2d ed. 1995).
155. "[A] case worker at the Domestic Violence Program of the Virginia Department of
Human Services relates that local police and judges treat Latina women seeking intervention
condescendingly: 'I know situations where the battered woman was detained because the
husband twisted around the story and the policemen believed him." Katherine M. Culliton,
Legal Remedies for Domestic Violence in Chile and the United States Cultural Relativism,
Myths, and Realities, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 188, n.20 (1994) (quoting Carol A. Doug-
las, Latin American Immigrant Women: Battered in the U.S., in OFF OUR BACKS, May 1990,
at 3); see also Joyce Shelby, Battered Immigrants Have Way Out in Group, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 24, 1996, Suburban at 3 (telling how one abused woman refused to go the police
because she did not think they would believe her over her husband who was considered a
"model citizen").
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A. Case Studies: Demonstrating the Problems When the Immigrant
Woman is Arrested
As in any alleged criminal assault the actions of an accused immi-
grant may be characterized as self-defense, non-existent, mutual com-
bat, or an outright assault. When the perpetrator is an immigrant, li-
ability is complicated by the fact that there may simply be a lapse in
understanding about the norm in the United States or a misinterpreta-
tion of her actions by neighbors and the police.5 6
Notwithstanding, the underlying circumstance, an immigrant
woman's involvement with the criminal justice system impedes her abil-
ity to qualify for VAWA relief because it creates problems in meeting
VAWA eligibility requirements. Advocates foresaw some of the ad-
verse effects, and argued against these provisions." As noted above,
domestic violence as grounds for deportation was not adopted in the
VAWA, but became so in the IIRIRA.5 8
1. Self Defense and Dual Arrest Policies
Mandatory arrest laws help women and men who are in danger of
assault but at the same time they create a new category of victim, those
unnecessarily arrested.59 Women are arrested even where the statutes
limit arrests to "the primary aggressor." Additionally, in some states the
statutes require an arrest of both parties when the "primary aggressor"
cannot be identified."W Finally, arrest is often predicated on physical
156. See generally Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist
and Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
36 (1995) (evaluating the divergence of theories regarding a cultural defense and endorsing
admissibility of cultural evidence where it is relevant to the mens rea of the criminal defen-
dant).
157. See Kathryn J. Rodgers, Prepared Testimony by Kathryn 1. Rodgers, Executive Di-
rector NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, FED. NEWS SERV., May 15, 1996 (noting that the
HRIRA legislation contained provisions "that will defeat VAWA's goal of reducing battered
immigrants' fears"). The fear and quandary that have been generated by the new law was
predicted by advocates who urged a more moderate approach. See id.
158. See INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E) (Supp. III 1997) (codifying section
350 of the IIRIRA). See also supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
159. See Mundy supra note 117, at 11. "'A lot of times, I think arrests are being made
when they shouldn't be' says Kenneth E. Noyes, staff attorney and coordinator of the Domes-
tic Violence Project for the Legal Services of Northern Virginia." Id.
160. See Bracher, supra note 104, at 171-72 (discussing the City of Cincinnati's manda-
tory arrest policy which requires that the police arrest both individuals if they are unable to
identify the "primary physical aggressor").
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injury rather than actual aggression.161
Actions made in self-defense are often not considered at the initial
point of contact and most arrests of women fail to evaluate when the
women are acting in self-defense.62 Furthermore, domestic violence ad-
vocates who have "treated" female perpetrators report that most of the
women in programs ordered by the court were in fact acting in self de-
fense. 63 Immigrant women caught in these arrests cannot avoid adverse
immigration consequences unless criminal charges are dismissed. In
light of the heightened treatment of domestic violence cases this is not
likely. Assessing who is the victim is not always easy, and a standard
that requires the woman not to retaliate in order to maintain a status of
"victim" and "non-aggressor" accentuates the power of the abuser, and
may jeopardize the woman's safety by closing off traditional avenues of
relief.1"
For example, Elaine is a native of Hawaii whose first language is
Tagalog and although she is not an immigrant, she shares traits of immi-
grants in that "she is isolated from her family and culture, unemployed,
without her own car, and dependent on her husband for income."61 Her
four-year relationship with her husband, who maintains a black belt in
martial arts, produced charges and counter-charges resulting in break-
161. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 118, at 162-63 (describing a self-defense circumstance
where the woman was charged because the husband became injured).
162 See Hoctor, supra note 105, at 684 ("[mlany battered women who are arrested are
in effect being punished for protecting themselves in self-defense"). See also Batterer Inter-
vention Report, supra note 152, at 5 (noting that women's violence is often in retaliation or
self-defense).
163. See Hoctor, supra note 105, at 685 n.271 (citing to Zorza, Must We Stop, supra note
102, at 980). Tina Busey, Director of the Court-Referred Women's program at Counseling
Services in Denver has identified four types of female batterers: "Self-Defending Victims,"
"Mutually Combatant Women," "Primary Physical Aggressor," and "Angry Victims." Bat-
tered Intervention Report, supra note 152, at 73. She contributes the frequency of police arrest
in self-defense cases to the "confusing" behaviors the women may exhibit in the presence of
the police. See id. L. Kevin Hamberger and Theresa Potente concur. See id. (discussing the
conclusions drawn in L. Kevin Hamberger and Theresa Potente, Counseling Heterosexual
Women Arrested for Domestic Violence: Implications for Theory and Practice, 9 Violence and
Victims 125 (1994)). "'Research with the community sample of domestically violent [women]
indicated most were motivated by a need to defend themselves from their partner's assaults,
or are retaliating for previous beatings."' Id. (quoting Hamberger and Potente supra, at 164).
The use of Battered Woman Syndrome and Battered Spouse Syndrome to expand and de-
velop self-defense is a subject beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of this subject
see generally Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991).
164. See Hoctor, supra note 105, at 685-85.
165. Mundy, supra note 117, at 14.
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ups and reconciliation.'" Elaine was charged and convicted of assault
when she took a peanut butter jar away from her husband, Jesse, and
threw it at the kitchen sink.67 In a jurisdiction with a primary aggressor
statute, the actions of the police demonstrate how the complexities of
domestic violence impede even good faith efforts to assess complex
situations. Factors that adversely influence female arrests include the
conduct of the "victim." In situations where the victim argues with the
offender in the officer's presence, there is a heightened chance that the
"victim" will be arrested.1"6
As noted above, Elaine was convicted of domestic violence as a re-
sult of this altercation. 69 When the case came to trial, Jesse did not want
to proceed with the charges, but the district attorney would not dismiss
the case.7 The State offered Elaine a plea bargain: by which the prose-
cutor would have agreed to a 60-day suspended jail sentence.""
In an attempt to keep the conviction off her record she went to trial,
in part reasoning that "[i]t's his word against mine."'" The judge be-
lieved Jesse, and found that her actions were assaultive." Had Elaine
been an immigrant, this conviction would constitute a domestic violence
conviction under section 237(a)(2)(E) of the INA." It could trigger de-
portation consequences and would bar her from establishing the good
moral character that is required in order to obtain relief under
VAWA.1
75
In the following example, while the police did not arrest the woman,
166. See id.
167. See IL at 13-14. Initially, the incident began when Jesse, her husband, returned
home from work and Elaine wanted to talk to him about day-care problems. See id. Jesse did
not want to talk and left Elaine to make a peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwich for their son. See
id. Elaine says she was frustrated by Jesse's silence, and took the jar away to force him to talk
to her. See id. In response, Jesse called the police. See id. When the police arrived, each ac-
cused the other of shoving. See id. There was no evidence about which party actually shoved
the other, but the peanut butter jar was sufficient for the police to arrest Elaine. See id.
168. See Daniel G. Saunders, The Tendency to Arrest Victims of Domestic Violence: A
Preliminary Analysis of Officer Characteristics, 10 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 150-53
(1995) (noting that in a vignette where an abused woman continues to argue with the man in
the police officer's presence the likelihood of the non-argumentative victim being arrested is
1.53% and the argumentative victim being arrested is 10.58%).
169. See Mundy, supra note 117, at 25.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172- Id. at 24-25.
173. See id. at 25.
174. See INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (Supp. III 1997).
175. See Carter v. INS, 90 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding conviction for a crime of
moral turpitude would preclude good moral character under VAWA).
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under many domestic violence laws, she could have been arrested.
Paula obtained support from Lideres Campensinas, a grassroots organi-
zation of women, which educates farm workers about domestic vio-
lence. 176 "After Paula's first meeting with the Campensinas, she went
home and, with a baseball bat in her hands, told her abusive husband of
thirty-five years to leave."1 77
Prior to meeting with the Campensinas, she did not know about do-
mestic violence.178 She says, "[g]rowing up in Mexico, I learned the man
is the boss. If you don't do what he wants, then you must pay the
price."179 Today, she is free from her abuser, although he returned three
times."8° Each time she threatened him with "the bat and he went
away."' 81 In any of these incidents, the police could charge Paula with
domestic violence.
If her husband called the police and arrived to arrest Paula for using
unnecessary force, her attempt to end years of violence may cause her
deportation. A conviction of the charge creates grounds of deportabil-
ity, and precludes her from being eligible to obtain legal permanent
residency under VAWA. Paula's case demonstrates the difficulty in as-
sessing cases where the woman is charged with abuse.
The question which must be answered is whether the woman is act-
ing in self-defense or some other form of empowered state to terminate
long-standing violence. If she is doing the latter, she should not simply
be characterized as an abuser herself, with all access to immigration re-
lief denied. As anti-domestic violence policies increase punitive acts
against the perpetrators who are presumed to be male, adverse conse-
quences attach to women who are accused as perpetrators.
In the past many of these cases were handled by placing the woman
into diversion or treatment programs.' This form of relief was particu-
larly helpful when dealing with women who are arrested "for defending
themselves in the midst of a violent argument."'' Presently, many of
these programs are unavailable or require admissions in criminal court
176. See Pamela Warrick, A Life of Their Own; They Have Been the Victims of Abusive
Men-Husbands, Bosses-And Have Spent Years Laboring in the Fields, But Farm Worker
Women are Learning How to Fight for Their Rights, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1996, at El.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. See Hooper, supra note 5, at 173.
183. Hanna, The Paradox of Hope, supra note 130, at 1576.
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which can be used against the women in immigration proceedings.' s In
these circumstances, the possibility of arrest maintains the additional
adverse consequence of reducing abuse reports. Studies indicate that it
is unlikely that a woman will report further battering when they fear
that they will be arrested ss
Given the increase in the prosecution of women, and the existence of
retaliatory actions by the abuser resulting in false accusations against
immigrant women, there is a need to carefully monitor the actions of
police which may exacerbate the situation by arresting the woman.6 In
order for a female perpetrator to be treated fairly, and not held to a
male standard, prosecutors must be trained in evaluating whether a
woman is acting in self-defense 1 s This evaluation is complicated when
the woman is an immigrant woman of color because an awareness of the
limitations for relief may preclude the State from obtaining accurate in-
formation from the victim.
[I]n a situation where the abuse is potentially, although not im-
mediately, life-threatening (for example, when the batterer is
continually making threats that she knows he is able to carry
out), her act of violence may be seen as both non-feminine and if
she is a woman of color, as evidence for the stereotype that
184. INA § 101 (48)(A)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (48)(A)(I) (Supp. III 1997); supra notes 87-
89 and accompanying text (describing the use of admissions in immigration proceedings).
185. See Hoctor, supra note 105, at 684. According to one researcher,
[e]ven severely- abused wives may feel compelled to remain in their marriages in or-
der to avoid deportation, which could mean permanent separation from their chil-
dren and a marginal existence. The migration experience itself aggravates the plight
of the battered spouse through isolation from family and friends, language barriers,
and unfamiliarity with legal and social services.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 32 (footnote omitted).
186. See LJ. Stalans & AJ Lurigio, Responding to Domestic Violence Against Women,
41 CRIME & DELINQ., 387, 391-94 (1995) (noting that under mandatory arrest schemes, po-
lice retain discretion because of the ambiguity of what constitutes probable cause); see also
Fedders, supra note 137, at 293. Fedders argues that
even in a mandatory-arrest regime, the police still must make probable-cause de-
terminations about whether violence has occurred; probable cause is not a color-
blind calculation. That is, police racism and classism may operate to make them
more incredulous of the testimonies of women of color and low-income women than
white and middle-class women.
Fedders, supra note 137, at 293 (footnotes omitted).
187. See Hooper, supra note 5, at 174.
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women of color are particularly violent. "
Although difficult, a case by case evaluation is possible and must be
undertaken to protect women acting in self-defense.' 9
2. Non-Existent Conduct and the Retaliatory Spouse
A second problem emerges for immigrant women who are falsely
accused of criminal conduct. Abusive husbands may file false criminal
charges against their spouses. In fact, some cases may be filed in retalia-
tion for the woman leaving the abusive situation. Filing false charges
against undocumented immigrants allows the abuser to show the woman
that his threats to have the system work against her can be carried out.
Alternatively, the husband may be the father of a mutual child with the
woman. Consequently, he may use false criminal charges to obtain lev-
erage against the woman, in child custody or support cases."
For example, after repeated abuse, Debbie left her husband Char-
lie.' The end ultimately came when Charlie asked her to move in with
him and his new girlfriend.'9 Charlie, informed Debbie that he was
seeing another woman, and he expected her and their children to live
with him and the new woman. '93After Debbie refused, Charlie severely
beat her.'94 The abuse escalated until she was beaten and tied to a bed.195
After her children released her, authorities arrived and transported
Debbie to the emergency room for treatment.'9 Staff members photo-
graphed her wounds."9 Afterward, she obtained a restraining order
against Charlie, and initiated criminal charges.' ,9
188. Id. at 175.
189. See id. at 174-75.
190. See Merritt McKeon, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Determi-
nation in California: Who Will Understand?, 19 WHITIER L. REV. 459, 465, 468 (1998)
(documenting the use of children as pawns in abuse situations).
191. See Untold Stories: Cases Documenting Abuse by U.S. Citizens and Lawful Resi-
dents on Immigrant Spouses (visited Sept. 8, 1999)
<http:lwww.ig.orglfundstories/story-debbie.html> [hereinafter, Untold Stories]. This web-
site contains a compilation of domestic violence incidents gathered from various sources. The
names of the victims have been changed and stories are added and updated periodically. For
more information contact the Family Violence Prevention Fund at (415) 252-8089.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Untold Stories, supra note 192.
198. See id.
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When Debbie filed for child support, Charlie became angry and he
and his new girlfriend accused Debbie of trying to murder them."9 They
filed criminal charges against her, and had her arrested.2 At the time of
her arrest, the police dropped her case against Charlie stating they could
not believe her."
Subsequently, the photographs could not be located.2 Debbie went
to court on the charges filed against her, and plead to a lowered charge
of illegal possession of a firearm.2 Although Debbie insisted she never
possessed the gun, she says she accepted the plea bargain to avoid hav-
ing her children sent into the foster care system.2
Another example of how tools designed to minimize abuse, become
tools of oppression is demonstrated by Alicia's case. Alicia is also the
victim of false charges. She received legal representation at the Cen-
ter for Legal and Social Justice, at St. Mary's University School of
Law. In her case, her husband's putative wife filed charges.2 Ulti-
mately, the BIA approved Alicia's VAWA petition, but not without a
substantial struggle that began when she left her common law husband.
Initially, he denied that he was ever married to Alicia, and claimed that
he was not the father of her two children. When DNA tests proved that
he was the father, the court ordered him to pay child support. In retalia-
tion, he reported Alicia to the INS which initiated deportation pro-
ceedings against her.
When her case came to the attention of the Center for Legal and So-
cial Justice, Alicia was represented by the Human Rights Clinic. She
was subject to immediate deportation, and faced permanent separation
from her children, who were at the time in custody of their father.'
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Untold Stories, supra note 192.
204. See id.
205. Alicia is not the real name of the client.
206. The Center for Legal and Social Justice is divided into five clinics that represent
low-income individuals. Alicia was ultimately assisted by the Human Rights Clinic, the
Criminal Justice Clinic, and the Civil Justice Clinic. For a more thorough examination of the
clinics, see Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461,
1490-1498 (1998).
207. As part of the case, the Center for Legal and Social Justice established that the
"wife" was not legally married to the husband since he had a valid common law marriage to
our client Alicia which precluded him from entering into a valid marriage with the other
woman.
208. See McKeon, supra note 190, at 459 (describing custody "blackmail" used by abus-
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While she remained in detention, the husband informed her that she
would never see her children again.0
With the INS unwilling to allow a bond due to criminal charges
pending against her, it became clear that she could not have engaged in
the alleged criminal conduct. Although her ex-husband's putative wife
claimed that she attempted to run her down with an automobile in a
parking lot, Alicia does not drive, and did not have access to a car simi-
lar to the one described.
During pretrial, the Center for Legal and Social Justice spoke with
the prosecutor to determine if the State would dismiss the case. Ac-
cording to the Assistant District Attorney, because this charge involved
an allegation of domestic abuse the State would not dismiss the charge.
The statement of the prosecutor is consistent with a hard line approach
to the treatment of domestic abuse, but it fails to consider the problems
that an immigrant woman with a manipulative husband encounters. The
prosecution acknowledged the relationship between the "victim" and
Alicia's husband. Furthermore, the prosecutor conceded that Alicia had
filed complaints of abuse against her husband and she had no previous
record of being abusive. However, the State would not dismiss the
charges because of its strict policy in domestic violence cases.
Unfortunately, Alicia's case is not unique. With diligent efforts on
the part of the Center for Legal and Social Justice, the prosecutor even-
tually decided to let the immigration authorities decide Alicia's fate, so
he dropped the criminal charges. With the charges pending, attempts to
qualify Alicia for VAWA relief were futile. As a result, the abuser,
through his putative wife, was able to frustrate Alicia's ability to present
her VAWA case because the INS viewed the criminal charges as an ad-
verse factor, precluding VAWA eligibility.
As these cases indicate, abusers are accustomed to seeking ways to
impose power over their victims. They are successful in their attempts
when the criminal justice system fails to recognize the complexity of the
ers who do not want to obtain custody of the child but who do want to avoid child support).
209. See id. at 459 (describing how men use the custody process to further abuse
women). "Forty states currently have statutes that make domestic abuse at least one of the
factors that judges must consider when determining who should have custody of the chil-
dren." Hoctor, supra note 105, at 685 (stating that this result reflects another unintended
consequence of a false arrest); see also V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State
Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229
(1996); Rebecca D. Cornia, Essay, Current Use of Battered Woman Syndrome: Institutionali-
zation of Negative Stereotypes About Women, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 99, 114 (1997) (noting
that women in custody disputes may be required to show that they have changed and will not
continue in violent relationships).
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power dynamics present in domestic violence cases."' The potential for
misuse is great and, therefore, the need to carefully consider collateral
effects of criminal convictions is high.
3. The Woman as Aggressor and Mutual Conduct
The feminist paradigm embraced by many domestic violence advo-
cates, ignores or denies the existence of "mutual combat and female ag-
gression. " 21' This creates a schizophrenic response which has advocates
arguing that women should not be arrested regardless of probable
cause.21 2 Researchers Murray Straus and Richard Gelles argue that one-
half of all spousal violence is reciprocal.
Programs addressing domestic violence by women acknowledge that
they act in mutual combat2 4 and as the primary aggressor. 5 In light of
this evidence, it is important to recognize that the traditional treatment
of women as victims fails to appropriately deal with circumstances
where the woman is in fact a perpetrator of domestic violence.216  Al-
though this category of abusers is relatively small and immigrant women
compose an even smaller portion within this group, the consequences
for immigrant women who abuse are severe. The complexity of the
210. Even when the petitioner has filed a petition for legal permanent residency he re-
tains the power to adversely affect her immigration status by filing false criminal charges. In
one case, the abuser filed charges alleging that his immigrant spouse had stolen money and a
firearm from him. See Untold Stories, supra note 191. She left him when he asked her to per-
form illegal acts and found out that in addition to the criminal charges the abuser had filed for
a dissolution of their marriage, six months prior to the termination of her conditional resi-
dency. See id. His actions were deliberate and effective methods aimed at minimizing her
ability to remain in the United States. See id.
211. Cathy Young, Domestic Violations, REASON MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 1998 (citing Min-
neapolis Experiment) available in 1998 WL 9948298; see also Fedders, supra note 137, at 285-
87 (arguing that traditional advocates essentialize battered women, prioritizing patriarchy and
ignoring issues of "class, race, country of origin, ethnicity and individualized personality
traits").
212 See Young, supra note 211, at 28.
213. See id.; see also Hanna, The Paradox of Hope, supra note 130, at 1559-72 (discussing
research that exemplifies the conflict between the perspective of social scientists and femi-
nists).
214. See Batterer Intervention Repor4 supra note 152, at 73. "Mutually Combatant
Women. Approximately 2 to 3 percent of female defendants arrested for battering are in re-
lationships in which both partners attempt to inflict injury equally on the other, but neither
party has ever been threatened with murder or sexual abuse." Id.
215. See id. "Primary Physical Aggressors. Approximately 2 percent of women arrested
for domestic violence are the primary physical aggressors. In these cases, there are injuries to
the man and none to the woman, and the man has been threatened with injury or murder if he
attempts to leave the relationship." Id.
216. See Young, supra note 211, at 28.
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woman's situation requires an analysis and approach which weigh ad-
verse immigration consequences against the criminal justice system's
goals.
"Part of the problem is the one-size-fits-all approach to domestic
violence."217 Susan Finkelstein recounts this circumstance when she tells
how, against her wishes, her live-in boyfriend, Jim, was prosecuted after
they engaged in a mutual public fight.28 According to her, "'I lost my
temper, he lost his temper, and we got into a mutual scuffle.' 21 9 In her
mind, the authorities blew the events of a minor scuffle which occurred
in a public place out of proportion.m
In fact, it was the "primary aggressor" provision of the state statute
that kept her pleas from being heard by the police.21 When she tried to
tell the police she was as much responsible as Jim was, because she initi-
ated the altercation, the police stated that the primary aggressor provi-
sion required the arrest of the "larger of the two parties."22 Susan did
not feel empowered by the actions taken on her behalf and the plea bar-
gain entered into by Jim did not reflect the wishes of the "victim".'
As a result, she says "'I was helpless,"' and "'I had no rights."'"" She
describes the experience as paternalistic.' Unlike an immigrant woman
who may be too terrified by the process to speak out, Susan asserted her
rights. At one point she told the prosecutor, "'I didn't appreciate being
told what was best for me by someone who didn't even know me."'26
Yet despite her statements, authorities ignored her wishes.'m
Cases similar to Susan's minimize and alienate women by creating a
system where self-empowerment by women is not possible. This lack of
empowerment is heightened for women of color. Kimberle Crenshaw
notes that,
[w]here systems of race, gender, and class domination converge,
as they do in the experiences of battered women of color, inter-
217. Id. at 31.
218. See id. at 25.
219. Id. at 25.
220. See id. at 31.
221. See id. at 29.
222. Young, supra note 211, at 28.
223. See id. at 31.
224. Id. at 25.
225. See id. at 31.
226. Id. at 31.
227. See id. at 26.
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vention strategies based solely on the experiences of women who
do not share the same class or race backgrounds will be of lim-
ited help to women who because of race and class face different
obstacles.
The cultural lens that applies when evaluating the private acts which
occur in a relationship also shape the jury's perceptions about what
happened. The general reluctance of a juror to believe that domestic
violence is a "real crime" is reinforced by the reluctance of many immi-
grant victims to identify the acts of oppression they suffer as a form of
abuse. When the circumstances involve mutual combat and the woman
does not want to prosecute, the anti-domestic violence views held by
many jurors are used to minimize the domestic violence.
As one commentator pointed out, when discussing a mutual combat
situation,
often the closer we get to a true story of what happened, the
more willing we are to accept the defendant's claims of mutual
combat or provocation by the victim. This tendency to impute
some complicity by the victim in her own abuse reflects some of
the pernicious underlying societal attitudes regarding domestic
violence. 9
Furthermore, there is a need to address the circumstances where the
woman is acting as the primary aggressor.
In these cases, it is insufficient to rely on an approach which treats
the woman as a victim rather than an assailant. This class of women
could be classified as engaging in undesirable conduct both under the
criminal and immigration laws. Nevertheless, the significance of the un-
derlying causes should be relevant in assessing both criminal responsi-
bility and the question of whether the woman should remain in the
United States or be denied immigration relief.
There are many factors which are relevant to determining whether
they should be allowed to stay in the United States. Under the current
system a blanket approach exists which classifies the women as deport-
able or automatically excluded from relief promulgated in the VAWA if
they are convicted of domestic violence. This approach is too restrictive
and should be replaced with procedures which further the goals of both
228. Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 1246.
229. Durham, supra note 128, at 645-46 (footnotes omitted).
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the immigration and criminal law.
4. The Dilemma Posed by Diversion and Treatment
If the woman was in fact a perpetrator of violence, and she accepts a
plea bargain or otherwise is found guilty of domestic abuse, the convic-
tion that results creates additional hurdles which can adversely affect
her eligibility for immigration relief. If the criminal justice system offers
her the opportunity for diversion and counseling, the immigration con-
sequence remains the same as if she was convicted. Because diversion
programs are most often offered as part of a sentence agreement, the
diversion will be considered a conviction for immigration purposes.'
The characterization of a plea entered as part of diversion as an im-
migration conviction is unfortunate because treatment programs for
women accused of domestic violence make sense. The data indicates
that women perpetrators are not likely to re-offend and, therefore, they
are good candidates for alternative forms of punishment."n For many
immigrant women, treatment programs may assist them in understand-
ing the circumstances that led to the abuse and preclude them from en-
gaging in any future illegal acts.
Counselors of abused immigrant men find that explaining the law
may be all that is necessary to eliminate inappropriate behavior3n' This
opportunity should be available to immigrant women in a manner that
will not adversely affect their immigration status. Current requirements
for acceptance into most diversion programs in the criminal justice sys-
tem, however, create a bar to VAWA relief in the immigration system
because the "conviction" is a crime of moral turpitude or sometimes
even an aggravated felony.233
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Judges recommends
that diversion programs be allowed only in "extraordinary cases" and
only after the defendant has made an "admission before a judicial offi-
230. See Matter of Roldan, BIA Pub. 3377, Inv. No. A90-286-629 (Mar. 3, 1999).
231. See Schulhofer, supra note 150, at 2192 ("The danger that a first or second offender
will return to crime, especially to violent crime is not the same for women as it is for men.
This is not simply a false stereotype").
232. Tini Tran, California and the West Asians, Latinos Now Find Refuge from Domestic
Violence Services: Over the Last 10 years, Everything from Treatment Programs to Court
Services Have Been Modified to Address the Needs of Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1998,
at A3, available in 1998 WL 2424288 (reporting that the Latino Service Center in Santa Ana
California, and the Vietnamese Community of Orange County are two non profit groups that
work with batterers referred by the courts). Counselors note: "[s]ometimes, the need is as
basic as explaining the law to the abusive spouse." Id.
233. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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cer." These requirements may make sense when applied to the typical
non-immigrant male defendant; however, under the immigration laws
these requirements constitute a conviction, which may bar the defendant
from qualifying for VAWA relief. Even where the plea is entered pur-
suant to a diversion that holds her conviction in abeyance or eliminates
it altogether, it is a final conviction for immigration purposes."5 This
consequence undermines the choices of an informed defendant.
Furthermore, anti-domestic violence advocates generally do not fa-
vor joint counseling.2 They assert that "joint counseling with the victim
or mediation suggest that the victim played some role in precipitating
the violence and that she also needs to change her behavior."27 In gen-
eral, it is an undesirable result to hold the victim responsible but there
may be an appropriate circumstance, such as mutual combat, which war-
rants alternative treatment including joint counseling.
In fact, some proponents argue that, "[f]or many couples in violent
relationships, particularly those involved in mutual violence, joint coun-
seling offers the best solution."' In circumstances where the woman is
acting out of ignorance to the laws, or mutual combat, a criminal re-
sponse that includes counseling and/or diversion may be more appropri-
ate than one which simply creates adverse criminal and immigration
consequences. The unique and complex circumstances confronting im-
migrant women perpetrators of domestic violence highlights the ten-
sions that are created by the intersection of criminal and immigration
law.
5. Unique Issues Posed by Immigrant Communities
a. Asian Cultural Taboos and Barriers
Confronting domestic violence in immigrant communities requires
an awareness of the unique cultural realities of the various communities.
For instance, in the South Asian tradition, immigrant women face a
double barrier since "traditionally South Asians do not speak of their
family problems to the outside world and immigrants are even less will-
ing to do so because it will break the model minority image the commu-
234. Cahn, supra note 122, at 173.
235. See supra note 156.
236. See Yvette J. Mabbun, Comment, Title III of the Violence Against Women Act: The
Answer to Domestic Violence or a Constitutional Time-Bomb?, 29 ST. MARY'S LJ. 207, 250
n.186 (1997) (citing authority).
237. Cahn, supra note 122, at 173.
238. Young, supra note 211, at 31.
1999]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
nity is so proud of."' 9 Furthermore, "the community ostracizes those
who speak out against it. ,20
There is a heightened relationship between culture and identity in
these communities. In Southeast Asian communities, the members of
the group are not, individual-centered, and, therefore, American mes-
sages of choices and rights may contradict the woman's own view about
herself.24 Furthermore, her identity is often defined by belonging to or
being part of a group.242 The need for this belonging may place the
woman in a circumstance that promotes the woman as a victim.243 Sensi-
tivity to the cultural norms does not condone the use of violence, instead
it requires a look at the ways in which "'fear, guilt, and shame"' are ap-
plied to keep many Asian women from seeking an end to domestic vio-
lence.2'
Karin Wang argues that the following factors distinguish battered
Asian American women from white women: "(1) the overwhelmingly
immigrant character of Asian American communities, (2) the existence
of similar cultural patterns across most Asian American communities,
and (3) the existence of harmful stereotypes about Asian Americans
collectively and Asian American women specifically. " 245
Even the support systems established for African-American and
white women can pose threats to certain groups. For example, Cambo-
dian women who faced Khmer Rouge re-education camps may find
support groups uncomfortable.246 These realities make it difficult for
women to document the abuse that they suffer. The lack of documenta-
tion may adversely affect determinations on their claims for VAWA re-
lief and their attempts to seek assistance from the criminal justice sys-
239. Ritu Yadav, Domestic Violence In South Asian Communities, INDIA TIMES, May 2,
1997, at 35, available in 1997 WL 11704791.
240. Id.; see also Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence
against Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1311, 1323-24, (1991) (noting that "taking a stand against the traditional, patriarchal values"
risks marginalization within the community).
241. See Rimonte, supra note 240, at 1322; see also Wang, supra note 118, at 167-68 (de-
scribing commonalties among Asian subgroups).
242- See Rimonte, supra note 240, at 1322.
243. See id. at 1324 (describing abuse as consistent with the values of the culture).
244. Id. at 1315, 1325. Rimonte, notes that: "In the name of culture, abusive Pacific-
Asian men justify their violence against women; and in the name of culture, women are pres-
sured to accept their lot and to exhort their children to suffer the same." Id. at 1317.
245. Wang, supra note 118, at 161.
246. See Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence:
Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 358 (1995) (describing psychological dis-
comfort for certain women in counseling programs).
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tern.
b. Latinas and Domestic Violence
In 1991, the Immigrant Women's Task Force of the Coalition for
Immigrant and Refugee Rights and Services conducted a survey of four
thousand undocumented women in the San Francisco Bay area. Thirty-
five percent of the Latina participants had experienced some form of
domestic abuse.2 7 AYUDA, Inc., conducted another survey in the
Washington, D.C. area, and the preliminary information yielded a 60%
rate of abuse among Latina's.2 8
These statistics demonstrate the prevalence of domestic violence in
the Latino community.
Cultural norms contribute to this abuse. The patriarchal structures
of the Latino community limit the roles of women and promote a focus
on the preservation of the family at all costs.4 In addition, Latinas of-
ten encounter economic obstacles. 2 "[LIabor statistics... show that
Latinas are more concentrated in low paying, semi-skilled occupations
than the overall work force."2'' They have a lower level of education
and often lack job skills which combine to make them vulnerable to do-
mestic violence 2 Culturally Latinas are often taught to be subservient
to the needs of the man or the family23 In these ways, Latina women
have cultural roots which can undermine self-esteem and increase the
likelihood that male control can be exercised against them.'
Survivors of the abuse also face barriers in the receipt of services
247. See Untold Stories, supra note 191.
248. See Susan Girardo Roy, Note, Restoring Hope or Tolerating Abuse? Responses to
Domestic Violence against Immigrant Women, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 236,266 (1995).
249. See Kelly, Stories from the Front, supra note 9, at 681.
250. See Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis
of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 231,238 (not-
ing overrepresentation of Latinas in the lowest-paying jobs) [hereinafter, Rivera, An Analysis
of Race]. The tenuous immigration status of some Latinas force them into the underground
labor market. See id. at 237.
251. MYRNA M. ZAMBRANO, MEJOR SOLA QUE MAL ACOMPANADA, FOR THE
LATINA IN AN ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIP, 131 (Myrna M. Zambrano, ed., bilingual ed. 1996)
(citing to the 1983 Handbook on Women Workers, U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Office of the Secre-
tary Women's Bureau).
252. See id.; see also Jenny Rivera, Preliminary Report Availability of Domestic Violence
Services for Latina Survivors in New York State, 16 IN PUB. INTEREST 1, 5-6 (1997-98) (noting
that women with "incomes less than $10,000 were more likely to report domestic violence in-
cidents") [hereinafter, Rivera Preliminary Report].
253. See Rivera, An Analysis of Race, supra note 250, at 241.
254. See id. at 241.
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which can free them from the cycles of violence. ' 5 One of the most
prominent limitations emerges as a result of linguistic barriers because
there is shortage of safe shelters which can accommodate non English-
speaking clients."6 Feelings of isolation often emerge as a result when
clients are transferred to distant locations in order to obtain shelter.'
c. Non-African-American Black Immigrants
Black immigrant women of color are often disadvantaged by the
stereotypes that exist for African-American women.' Studies regard-
ing the failure of the battered women's syndrome to assist African-
American women demonstrate the problem. 9 The research has uncov-
ered an unwillingness of jurors to apply the "learned helplessness the-
ory" to African-American women.2
The perceptions of jurors about the strength of black women un-
dermine claims that she was acting because of the battered women's
syndrome.2 61 When black immigrant women are labeled in the same
way, relevant factors regarding their pre-immigrant history are ignored.
For example, Jamaican Blacks demonstrate the difficulty of having a
dual identity of Black and immigrant.2  Because Black immigrant
women have multiple identities and face unique challenges it is impor-
tant not to essentialize these women. 23 The multiple impacts of race,
gender, class, and language often coalesce for Black immigrants in ways
which create new experiences with race and gender.26' The past experi-
255. See Rivera, Preliminary Report, supra note 252, at 3 (noting needs which emerge
due to linguistic and cultural needs of the Latina community).
256. See id. at 14-15 (noting a shortage of trained bilingual staff).
257. See id. at 17 (finding that the placements also put the women in communities that
are "racist xenophobic or anti-immigrant").
258. See Ruttenberg, supra note 97, at 179. "Proponents of mandatory arrest policy,
who are also gender essentialists, do not fully acknowledge that white women can indeed be
the oppressors of Black men and women in their alliance with the state." I&
259. See Linda L. Ammons, Mfules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and
Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L.
REv. 1003, 1070-71 (1995).
260. Id. at 1070-73.
261. See id. at 1077-78. "[T]he typical images of black women may be a barrier to seeing
the defendant as not culpable (either because of her strength of character, or her suspect
character) for the violent encounter(s)." Id. at 1078.
26Z See Hope Lewis, Lionheart Gals Facing the Dragon: The Human Rights of Interna-
tional Black Women in the United States, 76 OR. L. REv. 567, 575 (1997) (noting that Jamai-
can women are both Black and other).
263. See id. at 575 (arguing against overlooking the specifics of their lives by treating
them as universal).
264. See id. at 619.
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ence and current political relationship with the immigrants native coun-
try impacts upon the treatment of the immigrant. Women from Haiti,
Cuba, Brazil, and Jamaica all encounter domestic violence and immigra-
tion issues both differently and the same.m
Their prior experiences shape their responses in the United States,
and as a result they are suspicious of interactions with official govern-
ment agencies and may fail to provide sufficient evidence of current acts
of domestic violence. In addition to all of the specific cultural barriers,
which work against the prosecution of male abusers, immigrant women
of color face other barriers that compound their fear about engaging the
criminal justice system.' Adverse immigration consequences that may
attach as a result of criminal action impede the woman's ability to turn
to the criminal justice system for help. As demonstrated below, the
economic, personal, and legal loss, that may occur, prevent some immi-
grants from seeking any assistance.
B. Problems Caused by the Arrest of the Male Immigrant
1. Economic Ruin
Economic dependence on their abusers is one reason battered
women do not leave their abusers. The nature of the dominance exer-
cised against a battered woman often leads to isolation and lack of job
skills.' For immigrant women, this is heightened by the absence of
work authorization and ineligibility for public assistance.2
s
Women who attempt to flee often are forced back to their abusers
because of economic necessity. 9 Even VAWA applicants whose peti-
265. See id. at 625.
266. See Davis & Erez, supra note 118 (finding that recent immigrants fail to report
crimes and that domestic violence is the most under reported crime); Wang, supra note 118 at
172, nn.129-134 (describing reasons for the lack of reporting in the Asian community). In ad-
dition, even if immigrant women do report incidents of abuse, victims enter the criminal jus-
tice system unprepared for the number of court appearances and other requirements. See
Corsilles, supra note 93, at 870.
267. See Lilienthal, supra note 20 at 1596,1626 (1996).
268. See id. at 1627, 1630-31. Although battered aliens are "qualified" aliens, see 8
U.S.C. § 1641(c) (Supp. III 1997) under the welfare reform laws, they only receive assistance
if the state has affirmatively extended them benefits. See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1) (Supp. III
1997).
269. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26-27 (1993); Yadav, supra note 240 at 35; but see
Wang, supra note 113, at 171 (noting that many Asian women find jobs to supplement the
family income but nonetheless this adds to a displacement of the male's role as sole bread-
winner).
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tions are approved might not be granted work authorization.27" An ap-
plicant married to a non-United States citizen is not eligible for adjust-
ment of status, and is therefore not statutorily eligible for work authori-
zation."l If the applicant is or was married to a legal permanent
resident, they may only obtain work authorization after their VAWA
application is approved and they are granted deferred action status.27
Women who do not have petitions filed cannot obtain relief.'
For women in these positions the economic ruin that they face is a
substantial barrier to seeking outside assistance. Those who do leave
their abusers and survive economically are often forced into menial la-
bor because they do not have work authorization or they may jeopard-
ize their relief by working with false documents. For those who survive
economically, the pursuit of criminal sanctions against the abuser may
lead to adverse consequences on their eligibility for relief.
2. Termination of the Abuser's Status and the Victim's Relief
Because deportation may result from a conviction of an aggravated
felony or domestic violence charge, immigrant victims who derive a
status from their legal permanent resident batterers must choose be-
tween immigration relief and criminal prosecution. Taking criminal ac-
tion against the batterer may result in termination of his or her legal
permanent resident status.274 This termination, in turn, extinguishes the
victim's ability to self-petition for status as an immigrant under the
270. See Virtue, Supplemental Guidance, supra note 24, at 3.
271. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9) (1999). See also Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory
Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 343 (1994) (discussing how the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)
created work authorization as a prerequisite to lawful employment in the United States).
Furthermore, those immigrants who are placed in deferred action must submit requests for
work authorization to the Vermont Service Center. See Virtue, Supplemental Guidance, su-
pra note 24, at 3.
27Z See Virtue, Supplemental Guidance, supra note 24, at 3 (authorizing this status and
work authorization in the discretion of the INS).
273. Anita has fled an extremely abusive situation, and her difficulties are compounded
by her inability to secure steady work because she is not authorized to work in the United
States. See Untold Stories, supra note 191. As a result she works in underground jobs that do
not pay well. See id.
274. See INA § 246(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (Supp. III 1997). A conviction of an aggra-
vated felony or domestic abuse charge allows the initiation of immigration proceedings and
the completion of the proceeding terminates the legal permanent residency of the alien. See
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) & (E)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) & (E)(iii) (Supp. III 1997).
INA section 246(a) as amended by section 378 of IIRIRA clarifies that no further proceeding
is required to terminate legal permanent resident status. See INA § 246(a).
[Vol. 83:163
NO RELIEF FOR THE WEARY
VAWA.75 The result of the new law is elimination of VAWA eligibility
because the self-petitioning relief is tied to the status of the abuser dur-
ing a valid marriage.
The regulations implementing the VAWA require the spouse of a
victim to be a legal permanent resident both at the time the application
is filed and when it is approved2 6 Thus, a prompt conviction in a do-
mestic violence case, followed by an expedited immigration hearing that
terminates the batterer's legal immigrant status, devastates the victim's
ability to qualify for VAWA relief. The VAWA does not allow the
woman to escape from the abuse without jeopardizing her ability to seek
relief.' Termination of the abuser's immigration status thus becomes a
barrier to seeking relief rather than an empowerment strategy.
When Congress tied the self-petitioning provisions to an existing
marriage, it decreased the ability of many women to move from the po-
sition of a victim to that of an empowered survivor. 8 Informed immi-
grant women who may be ready to move out of abusive situations rec-
ognize that the institution of criminal proceedings may lead to
deportation of the abuser, and if they are aware of the adverse conse-
quences on the abuser's status and their own relief, they do not seek in-
tervention in the domestic violence.'
The impact of the criminal action is heightened if the individual is
charged as an aggravated felon. The defendant is placed in expeditedimmigration proceedings,' and is ineligible for bail, and must remain in
custody throughout the immigration process."1 The Immigration Serv-
ice must make every effort to complete immigration removal proceed-
275. See INA § 204(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. III 1997).
276. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(iii) (1999).
277. See id.
278. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women" Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19-24 (1991).
279. See Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 16, at 309.
280. See INA § 238(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(3) (Supp. III 1997) (codified as amended
and re-designated by section 308(b)(4), IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(b)(4), 110 Stat.
3009 (1996)). Forty-nine states and 200 localities were awarded over 492 million dollars to
help pay the costs of incarcerating aliens who have been convicted of felony or misdemeanor
offenses. See U.S. Dep't of Just. PRNewswire, Reimbursement Funds Provided to 249 Juris-
dictions That Incarcerate Criminal Illegal Aliens, May 14, 1998 (visited Sep. 7, 1999)
<http:/www.prnewswire.com/micro/OJP>.
281. See INA § 236(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1997) (requiring the
Attorney General to take into custody any alien who is deportable as an aggravated felon).
The ability to effectuate this requirement is limited by established practices of the INS in
monitoring jails and prisons. However, the INS is required to create an effective system to
identify criminal aliens. See INA § 236(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (Supp. III 1997).
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ings while the aggravated felon is in jail or prison." If the immigration
proceeding is not complete before release on the criminal charges, the
INS is required to take the immigrant into custody m The INA also pre-
cludes a legal permanent resident from applying for a waiver of an ag-
gravated felony conviction.24 Thus, a determination that the individual
is an aggravated felon eliminates the abuser's immigration status and the
victim's eligibility for VAWA relief.
Many immigrant women who would welcome outside intervention
will not do so if the result is deportation of their spouse.2 Thus, immi-
grant victims of domestic violence are further alienated from domestic
violence relief as they will not seek protection or prosecution when they
know the effect is deportation of the perpetrator.m Mandatory prosecu-
tion creates a system where "some victims who fear or pity their aggres-
sors aren't reporting assaults that could send repeat offenders to
prison."27 Immigrant women are among those who do not report abuse.
One factor that contributes to this under-reporting is the self-petitioning
relief that was promulgated in VAWA, which requires a valid marriage
to a legal permanent resident or United States citizen at the time of ap-
plication.'
All of these factors work against the relief contemplated in the
VAWA. Women aware of these limitations are less likely to seek assis-
tance from the criminal justice system. In addition to the structural con-
cerns about their own relief, many women simply do not want to termi-
nate the relationship.29 Furthermore, the institution of proceedings
282. See INA § 238(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(3) (Supp. III 1997).
283. See INA § 236(c)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1997).
284. See INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (Supp. III 1997) (codifying IIRIRA,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 348, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)). The act eliminated deportation and exclu-
sion proceedings and replaced them with a uniform removal proceeding. See INA § 240, 8
U.S.C. § 1229a (Supp. III 1997).
285. See Kelly, supra note 16, at 316-17 (noting that the reasons that survivors stay with
abusers are complicated); Kelly, supra note 9, at 678.
286. See Kelly, supra note 16, at 309 (noting that emotional attachment to the abuser
works against seeking deportation).
287. Id. (quoting Det. Don Rimer of the Virginia Beach domestic violence unit).
288. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(iii) (1999).
289. Cultural norms exist which preclude many immigrants from seeking assistance.
Asian women are often unwilling to report abuse due to being ostracized by the community.
See Cheryl L. Tan, D.C. Domestic Violence Group Targets Asian, Pacific Island Immigrants,
WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 25, 1996, at B5. Latina's often face immense pressure to keep the
family together. See Tini Tran, California and the West Asians, Latinos Now Find Refuge
from Domestic Violence Services: Over the Last 10 years, Everything from Treatment Pro-
grams to Court Services Have Been Modified to Address the Needs of Immigrants, L.A. TIMES,
May 4, 1998, at A3, available in 1998 WL 2424288.
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heightens the financial difficulties of immigrant women. Often the men
have work authorization and provide the sole source of income. The
VAWA applicant cannot apply for work authorization until the VAWA
application is approved.29' Even at that point she may not be eligible for
public assistance.29
The efforts to bring the problems into the public fora are severely
undermined by the potential of adverse immigration consequences.'
The VAWA's intent of immigration provisions was to eliminate the
power of the abuser in an attempt to empower victims of domestic vio-
lence. The reality is that many victims are re-victimized by the actions
designed to free them from their batterers. In these circumstances the
promise of relief has returned to the nightmare of traversing a landmine
in order to avoid personal victimization by the criminal justice system or
denial of relief by the immigration system.2
3. Delay or Denial of Citizenship
An additional impediment to seeking protection from the criminal
justice system exists where the abuser is a legal permanent resident who
has filed for immigrant status on behalf of a woman. An approved visa
submitted by a legal permanent resident on behalf of a spouse does not
convey immediate entrance into the United States. INA legal perma-
nent residents who obtain citizenship, however, can convert a second
preference visa into an immediate family visa.29'
To make this conversion, the resident abuser must be eligible to ap-
290. See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 5; Virtue, supra note 24, at 3.
291. The PRA eliminated eligibility for domestic violence victims. Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (1996). Although they are defined as "qualified aliens" they can only obtain
public benefits if the state affirmatively acts to include them in the state welfare plan. See 8
U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1) (Supp. 111997).
292. See Tan, supra note 289, at B5 (reporting that one mechanism of power and control
that has been used by the abuser is a threat to have the woman deported if she calls the po-
lice). As one advocate describes what she has been told, "There is a reluctance to call the po-
lice because people feel, 'I'm illegal; my husband has always told me if I called the police I
would be deported.'" Id
293. See Fedders, supra note 137, at 292 (discussing that as one advocate notes, "[s]he
may engage in a careful cost-benefit analysis and determine that, while police presence would
be useful, an arrest would not. A woman may be dependent on the income of her batterer,
for example, or she may not want their children to witness their father's arrest").
294. See INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)
(defining spouses and children of United States citizen as immediate relatives); INA §
203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(1994) (establishing the classification for legal permanent
resident spouse and children).
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ply for citizenship.2 5 To qualify for citizenship, the resident abuser must
have good moral character for five years.2 An abused immigrant who
files charges against the legal permanent resident may jeopardize her
ability to move ahead in the immigration queue because a conviction for
domestic violence would eliminate the abuser's ability to demonstrate
good moral character which is required for citizenship. This factor sig-
nificantly affects women abused by legal permanent residents. The en-
actment of the new ground of deportation and the heightened treatment
of many "crimes of violence" as aggravated felonies undermines the
ability to seek criminal relief without jeopardizing immigration relief for
the woman.
An immigrant may be permanently barred from proving good moral
character if they are convicted of an aggravated felony.2' Thus, even if
the INS does not institute removal proceedings, the convicted legal
permanent resident seeking citizenship may be precluded from obtain-
ing citizenship.29 In a case when the marriage has survived the abuse,
this may have adverse consequences for an undocumented woman. If
the abusive spouse is applying for citizenship, this adverse effect may
further diminish incentives to report abuse. If the woman has a priority
date that can be significantly advanced by the abusive spouse becoming
a United States citizen, they have a reason not to report abuse in order
to maximize immigration relief.
295. See INA § 319(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1994).
296. See INA § 316(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (Supp. III 1997) (providing "during all
periods referred to in this subsection [the applicant] has been and still is a person of good
moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States").
297. It is unclear at this time whether the aggravated felony will act as a permanent bar
to proving good moral character. See INA § 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(8) (1994 & Supp. III
1997). This section states:
For purposes of this Act-No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person
of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is
required to be established, is, or was.., one who at any time has been convicted of
an aggravated felony [as defined in subsection (a)(43)].
INA §101(0(8).
298. See Matter of A-A, 20 I. & N. Dec. 492 (BIA 1992) (holding that it is unclear
whether INA § 101(0(8), applies retroactively to crimes which now meet the definition of ag-
gravated felony but which were not considered aggravated felonies at the time). For exam-
ple, crimes of violence prior to 1990 were not aggravated felonies, therefore, they should not
create a permanent bar to a finding of moral character.
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
A. Elimination of Good Moral Character Requirement
The VAWA adopted procedures to allow immigrant victims of do-
mestic abuse to terminate conditional residency status or self-petition
for legal permanent residence status. In order to qualify for this relief,
the victim must be a person with good moral character.2,9 A plea to ei-
ther a crime of violence with a sentence of more than one year or a
charge of domestic violence precludes a good moral character finding
and adversely affects a prospective VAWA applicant.
This was an unforeseen consequence which has became a reality due
to the intersections of competing provisions of the criminal and immi-
gration law. To remedy this adverse consequence Congress should
eliminate the good moral character requirement in the self-petitioning
statute.30'
The absence of this requirement in self-petitioning cases will place
the battered woman in the same position as any other visa holder.
An applicant under the traditional petitioning requirements need
not affirmatively establish good moral character as a prerequisite to ap-
proval of the visa petition. Requiring good moral character of domestic
violence victims is unreasonable and needlessly sets a barrier to relief.
In advancing this amelioration, the removal of the requirement in can-
cellation cases is not promoted, as good moral character in cancellation
cases serves a legitimate immigration control function. It does not,
however, serve a legitimate function when applied to self-petitioning.
Some advocates argue that simply eliminating the new ground of de-
portability that was adopted in IIRIRA can resolve the good moral
character problem. Even if the statute was amended to adopt this rem-
edy, it would not provide sufficient relief. In light of the expanded ag-
gravated felony definitions and the aggressive attitude of prosecutors of
domestic violence cases the elimination of the domestic violence depor-
tation ground is of little value. Undocumented women with spouses that
use the system to lodge false complaints, and those whose conduct is not
within the domestic violence provision remain unprotected.
The inequities that exist for self petitioners arise because they are
not placed in the same footing they would have been if their abusive
299. See INA § 249A(b)(2)(C).
300. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
301. See Kelly, Stories from the Front, supra note 9, at 687,704.
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spouses had not used immigration as an additional weapon of abuse.
The elimination of the good moral character requirement places the
self-petitioner on equal footing with other visa applicants. This remedy
advances the goals set forth by Congress when it passed VAWA and
ameliorates the adverse consequences to battered immigrant women.
B. Addressing Criminal Justice and Immigration Goals
For cases in suspension or cancellation of removal a different ap-
proach is required. The law should not perpetuate adverse conse-
quences caused by the categorical approach. Instead immigration and
criminal law goals should be evaluated and reconciled to promote pro-
tections for immigrant women who are victims of domestic violence.
One manner of achieving this goal is to adopt a case by case analysis and
allow criminal and immigration courts to grant judicial recommenda-
tions against deportation.
1. Adoption of a Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation
To facilitate the goals of both immigration and criminal law a new
form of judicial recommendation against deportation should be
adopted. The adoption of this relief would allow the greatest compli-
ance with the goals of both the criminal justice and immigration systems
vis-a-vis immigrants accused of domestic violence.' It would allow the
goals of the criminal justice system to be met by promoting additional
incentives for abusers to terminate their abusive conduct and allowing
immigrant women caught in the criminal justice system to end the proc-
ess and move forward. Under this scheme all immigrants convicted of
domestic violence and related crimes could have the facts of the case
evaluated to determine whether deportation should occur. By allowing
the criminal judge and the immigration judge to evaluate the cases each
immigrant could present facts relevant to the request for leniency. In
turn, balancing the cultural claims of batterers and their victims would
benefit the immigration and criminal law systems.m Because the most
effective reduction in domestic violence happens with swift punishment
and counseling of the abuser, the immigration laws should not act in a
302 See Maguigan, supra note 156, at 42 (recognizing the flexibility of the criminal jus-
tice system to accommodate competing interests if the focus remains on addressing root
causes of domestic violence).
303. See Cahn & Meier, supra note 246, at 359 (noting that evaluation of the cultural is-
sues in the immigration context may take into account the cultural realities of both the perpe-
trator and the victim, because a failure to do so condemns "perpetrators" who are in reality
victims).
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way to preclude this type of relief. Under the current scheme offenders
cannot take part in diversion programs because the offenses are then
categorized as deportable.3
This change is also consistent with the underlying family unity provi-
sions of the immigration law.' By allowing victims and abusers to ob-
tain treatment as a mechanism to diminish domestic violence this solu-
tion maximizes relief and minimizes harm to victims of domestic
violence.
The proposal would also facilitate the family unity provisions inher-
ent in the immigration system.3 The research indicates that those bat-
terers with criminal records pose a greater risk than those who do not
have a criminal record.' This approach in the domestic violence con-
text would accommodate the rehabilitative functions of the criminal jus-
tice system and still act as punishment to those offenders who do not
comport with an accepted non-violent behavior.'
2. Effectuating Justice: Encouraging Treatment and Deferral
Notwithstanding the adoption of mandatory arrest policies the deci-
sions about which cases should proceed in the criminal justice system
are left with the prosecution!" The question that has not been fully ex-
amined is how that decision should be made. The adoption of a judicial
recommendation against deportation would allow for an evaluation of
those factors unique and relevant to battered immigrant women.
The centralization of domestic violence from the social realm to the
criminal justice system requires an analysis of the underlying purpose
behind the criminal sanction. It also requires an analysis of the social
constructs which must be considered in implementing strategies to deal
with domestic abuse. The deterrence theory of punishment has been
304. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
305. See Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 593, 605 (1991). 1965 legislation changed the immigration system to rec-
ognize family unity and labor needs. See id. (citing Act of October 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 236,
79 Stat. 911).
306. See id. at 605.
307. See Michael Steinman, Lowering Recidivism Among Men Who Batter Women, 17 J.
OF POLICE SCI. AND ADMIN., 124, 127-31 (1990).
308. This approach also avoids the adoption of a "cultural defense." For a good article
on the difficulties in adopting a cultural defense, see Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individu-
alizing Justice through Multiculturalism: The Liberals' dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093
(1996). See also Alice J. Gallin, Note, The Cultural Defense: Undermining the Policies Against
Domestic Violence, 35 B.C. L. REV. 723,741-44 (1994).
309. See Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra note 94, at 1873.
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advanced with recognition that it is extremely limited in its application.
Advocates assert that the deterrence need not be specific, and that
mandatory arrest may have a general deterrent effect by informing
other men that violence will not be tolerated and will result in an ar-
rest.31  The rehabilitative purposes that can be accomplished through
convictions of perpetrators of violence are uncertain. Nevertheless,
studies indicate that swift punishment followed by counseling surpasses
simple mandatory arrest and prosecution.31'
Opponents and skeptics of the propriety of using resources to help
perpetrators often do not positively acknowledge the decrease in types
of violence that accompanies counseling. Instead, they cite to the pres-
ence of some form of abuse notwithstanding the counseling.3 Recog-
nizing that a counseling model that terminates the cycle of abuse would
produce the benefit of diminishing violence against women, some advo-
cates acknowledge that continued exploration of the effectiveness of
batterers counseling is reasonable. 3 In most jurisdictions, this is han-
dled by the extension of probation.
Under the new definition of conviction in the immigration law,3"' this
extension of the time of probation may adversely impact the defendant
and cause her to reject a plea in the criminal case. This prolongs the
criminal process and undermines the effectiveness of criminal interven-
tion. The longer the time period between arrest and conviction the less
likely it is that the perpetrator will cease the abusive behavior.
In this way, domestic violence is similar to many other types of
crimes. Evidence also indicates that a swift punishment close to the time
of the incident increases the likelihood that the offender will not repeat
the criminal activity.3"5 Researchers acknowledge that very little has
been done to further this in cases involving domestic violence.
In the criminal justice system, there is a need to train prosecutors
about the adverse immigration consequences that exist under the cur-
rent laws. Once education occurs, a method of evaluating the compet-
310. See Fedders, supra note 137, at 278.
311. See Bracher, supra note 104, at 155; see also supra note 107 (noting that in a replica-
tion study in Dade County arrest followed by counseling from trained professionals was a
more effective strategy in dealing with domestic violence than a mere arrest); Cahn & Meier,
supra note 246, at 176 (noting that court mandated counseling reduces recidivism).
312. See supra note 107. (summarizing statistics with a negative slant).
313. See idL
314. See supra note 86, and accompanying text.
315. See Durham, supra note 128, at 649 (arguing that "[w]hen the criminal justice proc-
ess of capture, conviction and punishment is working properly, the certainty of an appropri-
ately severe punishment creates a disincentive to commit crime").
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ing interests between immigration and the criminal justice system can be
adopted. Recognizing that there are two conflicting objectives, a fun-
damental requirement should be the prioritization of the wishes of the
women.
In immigration law, the family unity and the desire to put the women
at the place they would have been but for abuse is an important VAWA
objective. In the criminal justice and immigration systems, punishing
abusers is important. When these objectives cause conflict, the systems
should act in ways which empower the women and support them in their
individual journeys toward survivorship.
Under the empowerment model, this allows the women to have a le-
gitimate role in ascertaining their own needs. It also recognizes that the
unique wishes of immigrants of color may not coincide with the anti-
domestic violence proponents. This approach is also justified since the
criminal justice system's goals include a desire to rehabilitate the of-
fender and to provide specific deterrence. These are admirable goals
that should not be undermined by a mandatory arrest and prosecution
policy or by deportation that will preclude the offender from partici-
pating in the rehabilitating treatment program.
The short term result of sending the abuser away has devastating
consequences to the victim in the United States and precludes the op-
portunity of terminating the cycle of violence. Such a result may violate
international treaties which discourage the displacement of problems."'
Furthermore, in recognizing that many of the abusers learned the be-
havior while in the United States, it is inappropriate for the U.S. to ship
the abuser to another country where the violence will continue.
To allow advocates for immigrant defendants to present evidence
that will assist prosecutors and INS trial attorneys in evaluating the cir-
cumstances of the immigrants, a new definition of what should consti-
tute undesirable conduct must be established. Where cases involve both
allegations and counter-allegations, an in depth evaluation of whether
the immigrant is a "victim" of abuse rather than a perpetrator of abuse
should be made. That evaluation is meaningless under the current sys-
tem which applies a narrow view of good moral character. In fact be-
cause the termination of the abusive relationship is often the factor
which triggers the affirmative actions on the part of the abused woman,
the current system is wholly inadequate.
316. See Elizabeth M. Misiaveg, Note, Important Steps and Instructive Models in the
Fight to Eliminate Violence Against Women, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1109 (1995) (providing
a review of international approaches and treaties).
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The adverse impact on an abused immigrant spouse goes beyond the
typical consequences for entering a plea or pursuing mandatory prose-
cution policies. Immigrant victims who are charged, and enter pleas to
domestic violence or assault, may not only trigger grounds of deporta-
tion but may also be precluding options for immigration relief under
VAWA. This type of a result, without an opportunity to evaluate the
specific facts of the case, is unfortunate and contrary to the desired goals
of VAWA and the criminal justice system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although VAWA provides some relief for battered women, it has
also created a structure which re-victimizes many immigrant women.
The intersection of immigration control measures and the criminal jus-
tice system leads to contradictory and unsatisfactory relief for the
women subject to the myriad of laws. By trapping the women within
the criminal justice response, the efforts aimed at providing protection
for them become tools to use against them. Instead of freedom from
abuse, they become trapped in the abuse. To ameliorate these harms
the good moral character requirement should be eliminated for VAWA
self petitioners and a new judicial recommendation against deportation
should be implemented to address those cases where a criminal convic-
tion could harm an otherwise eligible battered immigrant.
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